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ABSTRACT
Previous research has demonstrated that judicial instructions on the law are not well
understood by jurors tasked with applying the law to the facts of a case. The past research has
also shown that jurors are often confused by the instructions used in the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. Social scientists have used two different methods to improve juror understanding of
legal instructions, psycholinguistic rewrites and bias-reduction techniques. Psycholinguistic
rewrites of legal instructions have been shown consistently to improve juror comprehension of
general legal instructions and instructions used in the sentencing phase of a capital trial,
however, there has been a call in the literature to not only improve the clarity of judicial
instructions but to address comprehension biases that interfere with jurors’ ability to understand
the instructions.
Because a bias-reduction approach has received limited empirical testing and has never
been tested on capital-sentencing instructions, this research sought to test the effectiveness of a
bias-reduction approach with those instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to hear
either Florida’s pattern instructions used in the penalty phase of a capital trial or the same
instructions with additional statements that mentioned and refuted biases thought to be associated
with established areas of miscomprehension. After participants heard the judicial instructions,
their understanding of the law on capital punishment decision-making was assessed.
Additionally, the participants were asked to render a verdict in a hypothetical case.
The results revealed that comprehension was higher for participants exposed to the biasrefutation statements than for participants who were exposed to only the pattern instructions.
Among all participants, greater understanding of capital sentencing instructions was associated
ii

with an increased likelihood that mock jurors recommended a life sentence, but this observed
association was not statistically significant when examining capital-juror eligible participants.
The results of this study suggest that efforts should be undertaken to improve specific areas of
Florida’s capital sentencing instructions.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Overview of the Chapter
This dissertation examines juror understanding of judicial instructions. As will be
demonstrated in the next chapter, the empirical literature has clearly shown that jurors do not
understand many elements of standardized judicial instructions. With that question settled,
social scientists have attempted to ameliorate those misunderstandings. Two approaches have
been taken to improve comprehension. The first approach has been to rewrite standard judicial
instructions with clearer language. Compared to standard judicial instructions, these rewritten
instructions are more understandable, but they do not produce total comprehension. The second
approach to improving comprehension is to refute juror biases that interfere with their ability to
comprehend judicial instructions that are inconsistent with those biases. In other words, jurors
have incorrect, pre-conceived notions about the law, and the only way to improve
comprehension is for legal instructions to directly refute those notions. This approach has also
improved comprehension. There are, however, a number of unresolved research questions in this
area. This dissertation examines some of those questions and builds upon existing research that
has looked at the relationship between comprehension of instructions and juror decision-making
in one type of judicial proceeding – the penalty phase of a capital trial.
The judicial instructions for which there is the most information about juror biases are
capital sentencing instructions. For this reason, these judicial instructions are used in the
experimental manipulations. Because capital sentencing instructions are an integral part of the
research, an explanation of the unique purpose of the capital jury, the current state of the capital
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jury, and the constitutional issues surrounding the capital jury are offered. First, however, is a
brief description of the American jury.

The Purpose of the American Jury
In examining the Bill of Rights, it is clear that the framers of the Constitution valued the
right to a trial by jury. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a trial by an impartial jury in criminal
prosecutions. The Seventh Amendment guarantees a trial by jury in civil matters that exceed
twenty dollars.
Even before the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution, Americans have
supported the right to be tried by a jury. American colonists embraced jury trials from the
earliest days of colonization (Levine, 1992). Jury trials were popular in part because colonial
jurors were able to protect colonists from the Crown through jury nullification. During the
ratification of the Constitution, the principal debate regarding the right to a trial by jury
concerned the degree to which jurors should be drawn from the locale in which the crime was
committed. Anti-Federalists, who watched King George sometimes take colonists to England to
face unsympathetic juries, were concerned that the new federal government could shop for a
favorable jurisdiction in which to hold a trial. Anti-Federalists concluded that local juries were
essential to protect citizens from the reach of an oppressive federal government (Abramson,
1994).
The role of the jury is to protect citizens from the excesses of the government. It is not
enough to trust the government to correctly conclude that a defendant is guilty; the government
must prove that a defendant broke the law, and this proof has to be accepted by selected
2

members of the community (i.e., the jury). The decision of a jury to either accept or reject the
government’s case is a form of democratic protection against government oppression.
Practically, this protection may be expressed through jury nullification. “Jury
nullification takes place when juries refuse to convict because they dislike a law or the use to
which the law is being put” (Levine, 1994, p. 101). Levine points out that jury nullification can
occur with unpopular laws and policies, trifling offenses, and crimes that jurors believe are
common (e.g., income tax evasion). In addition, jury nullification can happen when jurors
believe that the punishment for the charged offense is not warranted by the defendant’s actions
(e.g., failing to convict a defendant on a charge of first-degree murder for a mercy killing).
Over time, there has been an effort to minimize jury nullification and get juries to make
decisions that are consistent with the law. These changes have been brought about by a
formalization of the process. This formalization involves more specific legal instructions and
prohibitions on jurors personally knowing any of the parties (Abramson, 1994; Levine, 1992).
Currently, as Luginbuhl and Howe (1995, p. 1161) observe, “The role of the jury in a criminal
trial is to determine the facts from the evidence and then to apply the law to those facts.” The
sine qua non of application is comprehension. For a jury to apply the law, it is necessary that it
understand the law. If a jury does not understand and/or apply the law then its decision, while
possibly being legally binding, will not necessarily be one that is in accordance with the law.
The question of how well jurors comprehend and apply the law is an empirical one that has been
the subject of a fair amount of scrutiny from academics, journalists, and social scientists.

3

The Capital Jury
In most criminal proceedings the jury’s job is to consider the facts of the case and apply
the appropriate criminal law to determine whether an accused person is guilty. However, the
criminal jury is sometimes charged with another task: determining whether a capital murder
defendant who has already been found guilty should live or die. Since 1976, more than 6,000
people have been sentenced to death (Dwyer, Neufeld, and Scheck, 2000). Admittedly, capital
trials make up a small percentage of those tried for murder. For example, Paternoster (1984)
found that only 18% of all homicides occurring during a four and one-half year period in South
Carolina were capital murders (i.e., death-eligible murders), and the death penalty was sought in
only 36% of those cases (also see Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski, 1990). Though capital trials
are relatively rare, any mistakes in such cases can be critical because the ultimate outcome of the
trial is whether the defendant lives or dies. While this dissertation examines jury comprehension
of legal instructions in general, it pays special attention to jury instructions involving the possible
imposition of the death penalty. Because a major focus of this research is to examine jury
comprehension of capital penalty phase instructions, it is important to examine the history of the
American jury’s role in the death penalty process.

A Brief History of the Constitutional Role of the Capital Jury
In McGautha v. California (1971), the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder.
The punishment was left to the jury’s absolute discretion, and the punishment was decided in a
separate sentencing hearing. McGautha argued that because the jury was told that it had absolute
discretion in deciding if he should live or die, the instructions were unguided, standardless, and
4

that his life was going to be deprived without due process of the law. The Supreme Court ruled
that it was not constitutionally necessary to guide the discretion of capital jurors. The Court
approved the process whereby capital juries were allowed to make completely subjective and
idiosyncratic judgment calls about whether a capital defendant’s life should be spared. The
majority in McGautha went even further by arguing that it was impossible to write clear,
understandable legal instructions that enumerated which types of crimes were eligible for the
death penalty. In other words, the Court argued that it was impossible to guide the discretion of
capital jurors. Therefore, at the time of McGautha, capital juries were encouraged to make
completely unguided decisions about whether a guilty capital defendant should live or die.
Only a year later, the Supreme Court completely reversed its position in Furman v.
Georgia (1972). Furman, convicted of murder and sentenced to die, argued that the death
penalty directly violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. A majority
of justices agreed that capital punishment as it was administered in the United States at the time
was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. Although the justices agreed that the death penalty as practiced violated the
Constitution, there was little agreement about why then-current death penalty laws were
unconstitutional. This case produced nine separate opinions and at the time was the longest in
Supreme Court history (Bohm, 1999). Still, in reading the plurality opinion, it appeared that
capital punishment laws could be rewritten so that they would pass constitutional muster. The
centrist justices (i.e., those justices who did not believe that capital punishment was inherently
unconstitutional but had voted to strike down capital punishment as practiced in Furman) argued
that because of unfettered jury discretion, sentences were being handed out in an arbitrary and
5

capricious manner. Furman led state legislatures to rewrite their death penalty laws to be
consistent with the views of the centrist justices. There were two approaches that state
legislators thought would be consistent with the views of the swing justices: one was to enact
mandatory sentences of death for certain enumerated crimes and the other was to provide
guidelines for judges and juries to follow in determining whether death was the appropriate
punishment in a particular case. This discretion was guided in a bifurcated trial, which consisted
of a guilt phase and a penalty phase. If the defendant was found guilty of a capital crime during
the guilt phase, a penalty hearing was held. It was during this part of the trial that judges
informed juries of the relevant statutes, guiding jurors’ discretion to render either a sentence of
life or death.
The Court, in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), Proffitt v. Florida (1976), and Jurek v. Texas
(1976), held that states’ laws that guide jury discretion result in death sentences that are not in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. States that had
legislated mandatory death sentences were not successful. In two cases involving defendants
who were sentenced under mandatory sentences of death, Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) and
Roberts v. Louisiana (1976), the Court rejected as unconstitutional, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, any attempt to have certain crimes carry a mandatory death sentence.
The Court has held that unguided discretion in capital cases results in arbitrary and
capricious decisions, and that mandatory death sentences are also unconstitutional because they
do not fulfill Furman’s requirement that jury discretion be guided by objective, reviewable
standards. In addition, the Court has rejected mandatory death sentences because they do not
allow juries to consider mitigating evidence. The Court has ruled that the only constitutional
6

way to decide if a criminal defendant is sentenced to death is through guided discretion. This
raises the question of whether and how jury discretion can be guided to conform to the law.
The courts have not been receptive to appeals based on social scientific evidence that
argue that the capital jurors in a particular case did not understand the sentencing instructions
(Lieberman and Sales, 1997). Still, research in this area is important for several reasons. First,
some jurisdictions and courts may be amenable to altering the instruction process based on
research results (see, for example, Taylor, Buchanan, Pryor, and Strawn, 1980). Second,
attorneys could use the extant and future research to help them tailor their summations to the jury
to address known areas of miscomprehension. Third, issues surrounding how jurors comprehend
and apply instructions are important for theoretical insight into how people process and apply
information. This basic theoretical insight is valuable because it could be useful for improving
comprehension with subject matter other than the law.

The Current State of the Capital Jury
Thirty-eight states, the federal government, and the military have the death penalty as a
sentencing option. The remaining states and the District of Columbia do not (Bohm, 1999).
Recently, in Ring v. Arizona (2002), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the role of the jury in capital
sentencing. In that decision, the Court invalidated as being unconstitutional the death penalty
process of those states where juries were completely excluded from the decision to sentence
convicted murderers to death (Liptak, 2002). In light of this decision, the constitutionality of the
death penalty process of states where the jury makes a non-binding recommendation to the court
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is not currently known. It is clear, however, that in the future, juries will have a role in all capital
sentences.
There are essentially three different legal models for guiding the discretion of jurors.
Acker and Lanier (1998) describe these models as balancing schemes, threshold schemes, and
special sentencing issues. Under all three schemes, the prosecution must prove at least one
aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution does not do this, then the jury
should give the defendant a sentence other than death. Under balancing schemes, jurors are
required to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then recommend a sentence
based upon the comparison of the aggravating and mitigating factors. If the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors, then the defendant should be sentenced to death. If the jury
finds that aggravators do not outweigh mitigators, an alternative sentence is imposed. The
difference between balancing schemes and threshold schemes is that under threshold schemes,
jurors are not specifically instructed to balance aggravating and mitigating factors. In other
words, under threshold schemes, juries are instructed to consider mitigating factors, but they are
not told to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. Threshold schemes do not guide juror
discretion as specifically as balancing schemes. With special sentencing issues, jurors are
required to answer yes or no to questions about the capital defendant (e.g., Will the defendant be
dangerous in the future?). If the answers to these questions are “yes,” then the jury is instructed
to sentence the defendant to death unless there are mitigating factors that sufficiently outweigh
the affirmatively answered questions.
Because Florida’s capital sentencing instructions are used in this study, it is important to
note the state of the capital jury in Florida. In a Florida death penalty case, the trial is bifurcated
8

into a guilt phase and a penalty phase. If during the guilt phase, the jury finds the defendant
guilty of a capital crime, then a second trial is held to determine the penalty. During this trial,
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is presented. After this evidence is
presented, the jury is instructed to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors and render an
advisory sentence of death or life without the possibility of parole. This advisory sentence does
not have to be unanimous (F.S. 921.141). Because jurors are integral parts of capital sentencing
in Florida and in other jurisdictions, their understanding of the legal process is critical.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview of the Chapter
In this chapter, the empirical research addressing jury comprehension of legal instructions
is analyzed. This section covers both fact-finding instructions and capital sentencing
instructions. Next, efforts to improve the comprehension of these instructions are described.
Psycholinguistic and bias-reduction approaches are reported. Included within this section is a
discussion of the biases associated with capital sentencing instructions. After this, the empirical
relationship between instruction comprehension and verdict is explored. Finally, hypotheses not
tested in the extant literature are stated.

Jury Comprehension of Legal Instructions
Today, most jurisdictions use standardized or pattern instructions. These instructions
were developed, “to guarantee uniformity and clarity in the presentation of the charge to the
jury” (Buchanan, Pryor, Taylor, & Strawn, 1978, p. 32). Pattern instructions instruct the jury on
the relevant substantive law and give the jury general instructions about their behavior. These
instructions are given to the jury by the judge, typically at the end of the trial. These instructions
have formalized the role of jurors into a specific one: jurors are to apply the law to the facts of
the case. Even if a jury disagrees with the law, it is supposed to abide by it when making a
decision. While juries sometimes ignore the law (i.e., jury nullification), the goal of most courts
is for jurors to use the law when making their decisions (Levine, 1992). Presumably, legal
instructions promote this objective by informing jurors about aspects of the law that they
otherwise might not understand. If jurors, however, do not comprehend the legal instructions,
10

then they cannot apply those instructions. The next two sections examine how well jurors
comprehend either criminal or civil fact-finding instructions and how well jurors understand
capital sentencing instructions.

Jury Comprehension of Fact-Finding Instructions
Fact-finding instructions are those given to juries in either criminal or civil trials when
they are asked to make a determination of either guilt or civil liability. All of the extant studies
discovered through a review of the literature have demonstrated that jurors have a difficult time
understanding fact-finding legal instructions. Many of these studies used mock jurors in an
experimental setting. A major limitation of these studies is that the results may lack external
validity or generalizability. In other words, asking research participants to pretend that they are
jurors may not be the same psychological experience as being on an actual jury (Lieberman &
Sales, 1997). This criticism would be stronger if it were not for the convergent findings of other
research designs such as field research or surveys of former jurors. Field and survey researchers
have also found that jurors do not understand the judicial instructions they are given; this
congruent finding increases confidence in the findings of the mock juror studies.
Mock Juror Studies.

One of the earliest mock juror studies was conducted by

Buchanan et al. (1978). Using people who were called to jury service, but not used, they
exposed research participants to either criminal pattern instructions or to no instructions at all.
They found that the criminal pattern instructions significantly improved juror comprehension of
the law, but that there were still a number of areas where jurors had difficulty with
comprehension. These areas included both substantive definitions of the crime as well as other
11

legal terms such as “information,” “reasonable doubt,” and “material allegation.” Using similar
procedures, Elwork, Sales, and Alfini (1977) reported that subjects who heard Michigan
negligence instructions performed no better on a comprehension test than subjects who were not
exposed to the negligence instructions. Other mock juror studies of fact finding instructions
(Benson, 1985; Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Severance, Greene, & Loftus, 1984; Severance &
Loftus, 1982; Steele & Thornburg, 1988) have also found that jurors have difficulty
understanding many elements of the legal instructions to which they are exposed.
Field Research.

Princeton historian Graham Burnett (2001) provided a unique piece of

anecdotal evidence showing that juries have difficulty comprehending the law. Burnett served as
a jury foreman in a murder trial in which the defendant claimed self-defense. In his account of
the experience, Burnett described that many members of the jury incorrectly believed that they
needed to find the defendant guilty of one of the charges (first-degree murder, second-degree
murder, or manslaughter) before they could consider whether or not the defendant acted in selfdefense. Burnett suggested that some of the jurors’ misunderstandings of both the law and the
evidence were the result of inherent deficiencies on the part of some of the jurors. At one point
he wrote:
At several moments I have felt that my refusal to accord with a guilty verdict will reflect
as much [as anything else] a rejection of the competency of this body of jurors to reflect
weightily on a matter of such seriousness. In different circumstances I can imagine
having a certain kind of conversation that could bring me around to reject the justification
of self-defense. But there are some jurors here who are such idiots, so thoroughly
oblivious to good judgment, or so thick (regardless of their intentions), that it seems
improper to aid them in depriving a man of his liberty. (p. 128)
Burnett, however, does not wholly blame the jurors for their misunderstanding. He also
described how the oral presentation of instructions was not always easy to understand; the court
12

also refused to give the jury a written copy of the instructions. Burnett’s narrative implied that
juror miscomprehension was the result of the delivery and content of the instructions and
inherent deficiencies in some of the jurors.
Stephen Adler, a journalist for The Wall Street Journal, reported results consistent with
Burnett’s findings. Adler (1994) interviewed jurors involved in a complex anti-trust case and
reported a similar level of non-comprehension due to poor judicial instruction and juror inability
to understand complex material.
Surveys of Former Jurors. Two groups of researchers have utilized a survey
methodology to assess juror understanding of fact-finding legal instructions. Kramer and Koenig
(1990) surveyed 884 Michigan citizens who were called to jury duty. Because those called were
exposed to different instructions, the researchers had a naturally occurring comparison group and
were able to determine if being exposed to judicial instructions improved comprehension. They
found that more often than not instructions had no significant impact on how well former jurors
answered true or false questions based on the relevant judicial instructions. Specifically, for the
22 questions where instructions could have had a significant impact, only nine questions showed
a statistically significant relationship between exposure to judicial instructions and level of
comprehension. When there was a significant relationship, the relationship was nearly always
positive (i.e., the judicial instruction improved comprehension).
Utilizing a comparison technique similar to Kramer and Koenig (1990), Reifman,
Gusick, and Ellsworth (1992) surveyed 224 Michigan citizens that were called to jury duty. The
researchers reported that exposure to instructions on procedural law significantly improved juror
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comprehension, but exposure to instructions on substantive law had no significant effect on juror
understanding of the law.

Jury Comprehension of Capital Penalty Phase Instructions
Capital trials are unique among all other felony trials because they are bifurcated into two
phases. In the guilt phase, jurors determine guilt or innocence; in the penalty phase, they
determine sentence. As with fact-finding legal instructions, the weight of the social science
research presents a clear picture: jurors are unclear about many aspects of these penalty phase
instructions. For example, Haney and Lynch (1994) reported that college students after hearing
California’s penalty phase instructions several times were not always able to define
“aggravation” and “mitigation.” Mock juror studies and surveys of former jurors have yielded
similar results.
Mock Juror Studies. Diamond and Levi (1996) described the pioneering work of Hans
Zeisel. He became involved with a capital case involving a defendant named Free who had been
sentenced to death and who was appealing his sentence in part because he felt the jury did not
understand the capital sentencing instructions that were intended to guide its discretion.
Exposing mock jurors to the instructions used in Free’s case, Zeisel demonstrated that many
elements of these instructions were poorly understood. For example, on only 3 of the 16
comprehension questions did the majority identify the correct answer. Zeisel’s unpublished
research was presented to the court, but Free’s appeals based upon this argument were denied.
Zeisel’s research foreshadowed a consistent finding in the area of comprehension of capital jury
instructions.
14

Mock juror studies have demonstrated that people have difficulty with capital sentencing
instructions (Blankenship, Luginbuhl, Cullen & Redick, 1997; Diamond & Levi, 1996; Frank &
Applegate, 1998; Luginbuhl, 1992; Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995). Among these studies, a
pattern of miscomprehension can be observed: capital juries tend to be confused about four
general areas. First, they tend to misunderstand the burden of proof for mitigating
circumstances. Second, they are unclear about the appropriateness of using non-enumerated
mitigating circumstances. Third, they do not understand that the jury does not have to
unanimously believe that a mitigating factor exists in order for one juror to consider that
mitigating factor as a reason not to sentence the defendant to death. Finally, jurors do not
understand how to appropriately weigh aggravating and mitigating factors.
The Supreme Court in Walton v. Arizona (1990) ruled that a state could adopt any
standard it wants for proving mitigating factors so long as that standard does not lessen the
prosecution’s burden of proving all elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Depending
on the state, mitigating factors may have to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence or to a
juror’s personal satisfaction. In the states where capital-juror comprehension of this issue has
been assessed, the latter standard has been in effect. In these studies, jurors did not understand
that mitigating factors needed to be proven only to their personal satisfaction (Blankenship et al.,
1997; Frank & Applegate, 1998; Luginbuhl, 1992). For example, Frank and Applegate (1998)
reported that while over 80% of mock jurors knew that a prosecutor must prove an aggravating
factor beyond a reasonable doubt, fewer than eight percent knew that a mitigating factor only had
to be proven to a juror’s personal satisfaction.
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Looking at the issue of non-enumerated mitigating factors, four studies have
demonstrated that mock capital jurors do not realize that they may consider not only the
mitigating factors stated in the capital sentencing pattern instructions, but that they may also
consider any other factor which they believe is a reason not to execute the defendant as long as
the factor is supported by evidence (Blankenship et al., 1997; Diamond & Levi, 1996; Frank &
Applegate, 1998; Wiener et al., 1995). These studies have demonstrated that many jurors believe
that they can only consider those mitigating factors that are specifically stated in the legal
instructions. For example, Blankenship et al. (1997) showed that less than 40% of mock jurors
realized that the non-enumerated factor of remorse could be considered as a reason to sentence a
capital defendant to life instead of death.
Regarding the issue of level of agreement on mitigating factors, all five of the mock juror
studies of capital sentencing instruction comprehension demonstrated that capital jurors do not
realize that they do not have to be unanimous in their consideration of a mitigating circumstance
(Blankenship et al., 1997; Diamond & Levi, 1996; Frank & Applegate, 1998; Luginbuhl, 1992;
Wiener et al., 1995). Capital jurors may consider a mitigating circumstance if it is proven to the
personal satisfaction of only one member of the jury. As an example, Frank and Applegate
(1998) reported that only a little more than 20% of mock jurors realized that they do not have to
unanimously agree on a factor for it to be considered for a sentence of life.
Three studies demonstrated that jurors do not understand the appropriate method of
weighing aggravating versus mitigating factors (Blankenship et al., 1997; Diamond & Levi,
1996; Frank & Applegate, 1998). For example, Blankenship et al. (1997) showed that many
mock jurors erroneously believed it was appropriate to simply add up the number of aggravators
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and mitigators to determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances. Capital jurors seem to not understand that the weighing of aggravators versus
mitigators is qualitative not quantitative.
Surveys of Former Jurors. In addition to the mock jury research, surveys of capital
jurors have been conducted after they have completed their jury service. The most prominent of
these studies is the Capital Jury Project (CJP). The CJP is a multi-jurisdictional effort to survey
individuals who have served on capital juries (for an overview of the CJP, see Bowers, 1995).
One part of the capital jury project involves asking ex-jurors comprehension questions regarding
the capital sentencing instructions to which they were exposed. Using CJP data for North
Carolina, Luginbuhl and Howe (1995) examined how well capital jurors understood that state’s
capital sentencing instructions. Many of their findings are consistent with the findings of the
mock jury research. First, they found that many jurors, 41%, incorrectly believed that mitigating
factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, the same proportion of surveyed
jurors did not know that non-enumerated mitigating circumstances can be considered. Third,
only 47% of jurors realized that jurors do not have to agree unanimously on a factor for it to be
considered in favor of a life sentence (also see Eisenberg & Wells, 1993).
Other research has demonstrated that capital jurors have another misunderstanding about
capital sentencing instructions. Several surveys have demonstrated that capital jurors minimize
their responsibility for a death sentence (Geimer & Amsterdam, 1988; Haney, Sontag, &
Costanzo, 1994; Hoffman, 1995). For example, using CJP data for Indiana, Hoffman (1995)
reported that jurors tend to minimize their perceptions of personal responsibility for a death
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sentence by wrongly arguing that the capital sentencing instructions demand a particular
sentence.
The survey research has clearly demonstrated that capital jury instructions are confusing
and that there are consistent patterns of confusion. The survey results corroborate those of mock
juror studies, calling into question the wisdom of instructing jurors on points of law using pattern
instructions. If these instructions are incomprehensible or confusing, they cannot do their job of
informing jurors about how to make decisions. The next section reviews efforts to improve the
comprehensibility of jury instructions in general and capital sentencing instructions in particular.

Efforts to Improve Juror Comprehension of Legal Instructions
Because many elements of jury instructions are unclear to jurors, social scientists have
attempted to improve jurors’ ability to comprehend jury instructions. The most prominent area
of research has been in examining the effects of rewriting legal instructions using
psycholinguistic principles, which draw upon the fields of psychology and linguistics. Elwork et
al. (1977) gave this example of Michigan’s grammatically complex definition of proximate
cause:
When I use the words “proximate cause” I mean first, that there must have
been a connection between that conduct of the defendant which plaintiff claims was
negligent and the injury complained of by the plaintiff, and second, that the occurrence
which is claimed to have produced that injury was a natural and probable result of such
conduct of the defendant. (p. 168)
For another example, consider this capital sentencing instruction, cited by Diamond and Levi
(1996), telling jurors how to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In this example,
the use of long sentences and multiple negatives makes the instruction difficult to comprehend.
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In deciding whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, you should consider all
the aggravating factors supported by the evidence and all the mitigating factors supported
by the evidence…If you unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence
that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence,
then you should sign the verdict form requiring the court to sentence the defendant to
death. If you do not unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence that
there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, then
you should sign the verdict form requiring the court to impose a sentence other than
death. (p. 229)
Based on examples like those above, it is intuitively reasonable to conclude that the writing style
of pattern instructions is one barrier to juror comprehension of legal instructions. Efforts to
improve the writing clarity are a reasonable starting point.

Psycholinguistic Principles
Imwinkeiried and Schwed (1987) describe the four techniques of psycholinguistics:
choice of words, use of phrases and clauses, sentence structure, and overall organization of the
instruction. With respect to word choice, psycholinguistic norms dictate that abstract words,
legalistic words, and nominalizations (i.e., a noun formed from a verb) be avoided; in addition,
homonyms and synonyms can also confuse jurors. Words common to legal instructions, such as
“information” – meaning filing or charge – or “the court” – meaning the judge – can make
instructions difficult for jurors to follow. The norms for phrases and clauses include ensuring
that subordinate clauses are not missing the words “which is” and that clauses are not misplaced.
With regard to sentence structure, “the draftsman should be conscious of sentence length, the
voice of the sentence (active or passive), and the complexity of the sentence” (Imwinkeiried &
Schwed , 1987, p. 145). Finally, psycholinguistic norms prescribe that an appropriate
organizational pattern or combination of patterns be used.
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Several research studies have examined whether these principles can be used to improve
juror comprehension of legal instructions (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Diamond & Levi, 1996;
Elwork et al., 1977; Frank & Applegate, 1998; Severance et al., 1984; Severance & Loftus,
1982; Wiener et al., 1995). All of these studies demonstrated significant improvements in
comprehension when psycholinguistic norms were applied to various types of legal instructions.
Three sets of researchers have rewritten death penalty sentencing phase instructions using
psycholinguistic norms and assessed differences between currently used pattern instructions and
the rewritten instructions on juror comprehension (Diamond & Levi, 1996; Frank & Applegate,
1998; Wiener et al., 1995). Frank and Applegate (1998) exposed individuals called to jury duty
to either a set of instructions previously used in the penalty phase of an Ohio capital case or a
rewritten version of the instructions. They then asked both groups to answer a series of
comprehension questions. The jurors exposed to the rewritten instructions answered 68.4% of
the questions correctly, while jurors exposed to Ohio’s pattern instructions only answered 49.7%
of the questions correctly.
In another effort to measure the effectiveness of psycholinguistics, Diamond and Levi
(1996) rewrote Illinois’ capital sentencing phase instructions with an emphasis on improving
comprehension in three areas: unenumerated mitigating factors, non-unanimity on mitigating
factors, and weighing. They also measured whether deliberations had a significant impact on
comprehension. Their results indicated that the rewritten instructions significantly improved
comprehension in all three subject areas. With regard to deliberation, mock jurors who
deliberated did not differ significantly from non-deliberating jurors in two of three subject areas.
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However, deliberation significantly improved comprehension with the questions that addressed
non-unanimity on mitigators.
In a lone study that did not provide clear support for the effectiveness of
psycholinguistics, Wiener et al. (1995) examined Missouri’s penalty phase pattern instructions
versus psycholinguistically revised instructions. Using jury-eligible subjects, the researchers
examined comprehension based on two different sets of facts (i.e., two different accounts of
death-eligible homicides). The less heinous fact pattern involved the murder of a wife for
pecuniary gain, while the more heinous fact pattern concerned the strangulation of a small child
by a neighbor. Of the two fact patterns presented to subjects, the rewritten instructions produced
significantly more comprehension only with the less heinous fact pattern. The researchers
speculated that because this set of facts was less cognitively and emotionally demanding of
subjects, it was easier for them to comprehend the jury instructions.
The weight of the social scientific research is clear: jury instructions can be made more
understandable using psycholinguistic techniques. However, even those techniques alone do not
produce total comprehension. In improving overall comprehension to slightly below seventy
percent, the Frank and Applegate (1998) study, for example, is typical. Clearly, there are
normative and potentially legalistic concerns that this level of comprehension is not high enough,
and yet it is much higher than what courts can obtain without the use of psycholinguistic
techniques. It is a concern with a potential comprehension ceiling (Wiener et al., 1995)
associated with psycholinguistic rewrites that has caused some researchers to suggest that other
techniques need to be developed to improve comprehension.
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Jury Bias and Acceptance of Legal Instructions
Diamond (1993) has argued that simply improving the clarity of judicial instructions is
not enough to successfully guide discretion in the penalty phase of a capital trial:
But even if the language and structure of the jury instructions are clarified, even if
psycholinguists and social and cognitive psychologists contribute their skills, and even if
courts and judicial committees are receptive to these efforts, instructions that simply use
more user-friendly language are unlikely to dispel some major sources of lawlessness in
capital sentencing. Unless social scientists…go beyond the passive sponge-like model of
the jury and attend to juror expectations and beliefs about the court and the legal system,
juror responses cannot achieve the predictability properly demanded of death penalty
determinations. Jurors may resist even the most clearly worded directions. (p. 429)
The essential idea of Diamond’s argument is that when jurors are confronted with an
instruction that is inconsistent with their preconceived notions about the court system then even
the clearest of instructions can fail to instruct. She has argued that jurors have “schemas” or
biases toward the judicial system that must be addressed in order to further improve
comprehension. Diamond pointed out that research has demonstrated that one reason that jurors
recommend death over life is because they are concerned about the future dangerousness of the
defendant. Diamond reasoned that if jurors are instructed that a defendant who is not executed
will receive life without any possibility of parole (LWOP), then those jurors should be more
likely to vote for life than jurors who do not receive such an instruction. Diamond’s research,
however, showed that simply instructing jurors in this manner does not significantly affect the
death recommendation rate (Diamond, 1993). In an attempt to explain this non-significant
difference, she argued that jurors resist this LWOP recommendation because they do not believe
that a person who is sentenced to LWOP will actually die in prison. Simply giving jurors an
instruction that contradicts a schema is not enough to overcome the effect of the bias.
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Diamond’s work suggests that to truly have guided discretion, it is not enough to merely instruct
jurors on the law. It may also be necessary to persuade them to accept and apply the law.
Diamond’s hypothesis that juror biases affect comprehension had already been
demonstrated in the communication literature. Pryor, Taylor, Buchanan, and Strawn (1980) were
the first to demonstrate that jurors’ attitudes toward the law affected their perceptions of the
law’s accuracy. Pryor et al. showed that jurors were more favorable toward statements about the
law that they believed were correct than statements they believed were incorrect. This effect
existed even in those situations where the jurors were wrong in their belief about the legal
statement. In a second experiment, the researchers established that this “affective-cognitive
distortion” existed even after subjects had been exposed to the appropriate judicial instruction.
Pryor et al. proposed that judicial instructions should mention and refute juror biases towards the
law.
Smith (1991) provided additional evidence that jurors have biases that affect how they
respond to judicial instructions. Smith asked mock jurors to list features associated with various
crime categories (e.g., kidnapping). She found that many of these “naïve representations” were
legally incorrect. Using the results from these open-ended questions, Smith observed enough of
a pattern to develop crime scenarios that were either consistent or inconsistent with jurors’
biases. The following is an example of a description of a kidnapping that is consistent with
jurors’ biases about what they believe a kidnapping to be (i.e., a typical crime scenario):
Tony was playing ball with his friends in the playground of his elementary school one
afternoon. Ken knew that Tony’s parents were very wealthy and very protective of their
child. Ken called to Tony and waved him over to his car. When Tony came over, Ken
asked if he wanted to go for ice cream. Tony said, “Sure,” and got in the car. Ken
bought Tony an ice cream, then took him to a motel room, where he tied him to a chair,
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gagged him, and told him if he made any noise he’d kill him. Ken then took a note
demanding $500,000 for Tony’s safe return, and left it in the mailbox of Tony’s parents’
house. (Smith, 1993, p. 521).
The next example is of a kidnapping that is inconsistent with juror biases about what they believe
a kidnapping to be (i.e., an atypical crime scenario):
Leon was an investigator with the Drug Enforcement Administration. He discovered the
headquarters of a major drug ring and went there to gather evidence against them. He hid
behind a stack of boxes and listened to their conversation. In their discussion, the dealers
revealed everything Leon needed to bust them. When he tried to sneak out, he knocked
over one of the boxes and was discovered. The dealers told Leon to tell them everything
he knew or they would beat him until he did. Leon wouldn’t tell them anything, so the
dealers locked him in their hideout and left him there. (Smith, 1993, p. 521-522)
Both scenarios met the legal definition of kidnapping for the state in which Smith’s research took
place.
When Smith (1991) exposed mock jurors to the typical and atypical crime scenarios, she
found that jurors were more likely to render guilty verdicts for the typical scenarios than for the
atypical scenarios. After observing this effect, she attempted to ameliorate it. She found that
giving mock jurors relevant pattern instructions did nothing to mitigate this effect (Smith, 1991;
Smith, 1993). Consistent with the recommendation of Pryor et al. (1980), Smith decided to
develop instructions that mentioned and refuted jurors’ biases towards the law (Smith, 1993).
Consider this example for the crime of kidnapping:
Many people believe that kidnapping requires a ransom demand. However, a person can
be found guilty of kidnapping even when ransom is not demanded, and even when the
motive for the crime is not money. (Smith, 1993, p. 529)
Smith was able to eliminate the increase in guilty verdicts for typical versus atypical crime
descriptions by using judicial instructions that addressed and refuted the biases of jurors.
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Smith’s (1993) approach for remedying the effect of juror comprehension biases is what
is known in the communication literature as a refutational two-sided message strategy. A
refutational two-sided message is one that mentions and refutes the opposing viewpoint. In
contrast, a non-refutational two-sided message is one that mentions both sides of an issue
without refuting the opposing viewpoint while a one-sided message does not state an opposing
belief.
In research on persuasion, one empirical question that has received considerable attention
is whether a persuader is best served by mentioning the opposing side of an issue under
consideration. The existing communication literature has demonstrated that a refutational twosided message strategy is the most effective. O’Keefe (1999), in a meta-analysis that included
more than a hundred studies, reported that refutational two-sided messages are more persuasive
than non-refutational two-sided messages or one-sided messages (also see Allen, 1991). A
refutational two-sided approach is the one Smith used. Specifically, she was interested in
improving comprehension by persuading subjects that their preconceived notions were incorrect.
By using a refutational two-sided message in which she mentioned the incorrect bias and refuted
it, it appears that she was able to improve comprehension.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the extant research. First, jurors do have incorrect
preconceived beliefs about the law. Second, these biases can interfere with comprehension.
Third, if these biases are addressed in the instructions then their effect can be minimized. These
generalizations, however, have not been directly explored for juror comprehension of
instructions in the penalty phase of capital trials. The next section discusses possible sources of
bias in capital sentencing instructions.
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Jury Bias and Capital Sentencing Instructions
Most people do not have personal experience with the criminal justice system; even
fewer people have familiarity with the capital sentencing process. In the absence of direct
encounters with the court system, people develop their knowledge of the judicial system based
on the experiences of friends and the mass media with most knowledge coming from the latter
(Surette, 1998). When examining the general area of miscomprehension of capital sentencing
instructions, it becomes apparent that some of the jurors’ biases toward the instructions could
have been gleaned from the mass media. Other comprehension biases can be reasonably inferred
or are apparent from the extant literature.
It is important to note that there can be some state-by-state variability regarding the law
as stated below. However, these statements of law are correct in a number of jurisdictions and
some of them are universally correct as having been articulated by the United States Supreme
Court as the only constitutional approach to juror-involved capital sentencing schemes.
Burden of Proof for Mitigating Factors. Jurors have a difficult time realizing that the
standard of proof for mitigating factors is different than it is for most other elements of a
criminal trial. Guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial; aggravating
factors must also be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a mitigating factor does not
have to meet this high level of proof. The language used to describe this lower standard of proof
varies among jurisdictions. In Florida if a juror is reasonably convinced that a mitigating factor
has been proven then he or she may consider it as established (F.S. 921.141). Diamond (1993)
contends that jurors who are familiar with shows like “L.A. Law” may have difficulty
comprehending the lower standard unless the difference is explicitly pointed out to them.
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It seems intuitively clear that one reason jurors may have difficulty comprehending the
lower level of proof required for proving the existence of a mitigating factor is that there is a
preconceived notion, which could be the result of exposure to the media, that in criminal trials
any and all elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Non-enumerated Mitigating Factors. Jurors do not always understand that when
considering whether to spare an individual’s life they may consider any factor or factors that
could outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that the prosecutor proved beyond a reasonable
doubt (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978). In other words, jurors may consider any mitigating factor that is
supported by evidence and not simply the ones listed in the jury instructions. In this case, the
source of the bias may be inherent within the instructions. Jurors may only consider listed
aggravating factors so it would be reasonable for them to conclude that they might only be able
to consider listed mitigating factors.
Unanimity on Mitigating Factors. Another area of comprehension difficulty is the
issue of unanimity on mitigating factors. A jury does not have to be unanimous that a mitigating
factor exists for it to be considered by an individual juror in deciding whether a capital defendant
should be sentenced to life (Mills v. Maryland, 1988). To put this another way, an individual
juror can vote for a life sentence because he or she believes that a mitigating factor or factors
outweighs the aggravating factor or factors even if the other jurors do not believe that the
mitigating factor or factors were proven. This hypothesized bias could be the result of common
portrayals in the media. Media depictions (e.g., the movie, Twelve Angry Men) of the jury
process make it clear that jury decisions usually need to be unanimous. Because of this bias, it is
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possible that jurors resist even clear instructions on this point because they believe that juries
must be unanimous when considering a mitigating factor.
Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. One misunderstanding that jurors
have towards the weighing issue is that they believe that it is appropriate to simply add up the
aggravating and mitigating factors in order to see which quantity is bigger (Blankenship et al.,
1997). Diamond and Levi (1996) directly addressed this bias when they rewrote the Illinois
capital sentencing instructions. They included the following admonition:
In order to weigh the aggravating factors, taken as a whole, against the mitigating factors,
taken as a whole, you should NOT merely add up the number of aggravating factors and
mitigating factors in order to see which number is bigger. Weighing the factors is not
such a mechanical task, and there is no simple formula that you can apply to reach your
decision. (p. 229)
The jurors were instructed to assign individual relative weights to each of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to arrive at a final judgment. The rewrite improved comprehension on
the weighing questions. This rewrite is also similar to the two sided message technique
employed by Smith (1993) to address jurors’ biases towards sentencing instructions.
Perceived Personal Responsibility. The Supreme Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi
(1985) ruled that a death sentence was invalid if jurors were led to believe that they were not
responsible for their decision. Research has shown that capital jurors often believe that the law
requires a death sentence upon conviction of a capital crime (Garvey, Johnson, & Marcus, 2000;
Geimer & Amsterdam, 1988; Haney et al., 1994; Hoffman, 1995). In the studies that utilized a
survey design, the researchers reported that jurors’ belief in a legally required death sentence was
used to minimize their personal responsibility for the verdict (Geimer & Amsterdam, 1988;
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Haney et al., 1994; Hoffman, 1995). The clear bias is that some jurors believe that they are not
responsible for the death sentence when, in fact, they are.
Because of poorly written instructions and jurors’ own biases toward the law, it is clear
that jurors can become confused about the meaning of legal instructions. An obvious question,
however, is does the miscomprehension really matter? To put it another way, would jurors
decide cases differently if they understood the law?

Impact of Jury Comprehension on Verdict Decision
Only a few studies have examined the relationship between juror comprehension of
instructions and verdict decision (Diamond & Levi, 1996; Severance et al., 1984; Wiener et al.,
1995; Taylor, Buchanan, Pryor, & Strawn, 1981). The earliest of these studies, by Taylor et al.
(1981), had one of the most novel methodologies. Actual jurors were told they would be
rendering a verdict in a taped burglary trial. The purpose of the taped trial, as it was deceptively
explained to the jurors, was to improve efficiency by removing sustained objections. Because
jurors thought they were listening to and making decisions in a real trial, external validity was
greatly enhanced. All of the ten, six-person juries were shown a tape of a burglary trial. The
juries were then randomly assigned to hear the currently used pattern instructions on burglary or
rewritten process instructions on burglary.
Process instructions differ from the standard instructions in that they explain to the jury
not only the law, but also provide a step-by-step process for the jury to follow in its
deliberations. Each step in the process comprises a component issue in the case and must
be resolved before the jury can move on to the next step. If each issue is resolved as
alleged by the prosecution, the state has proven its case. If any one question is answered
contrary to the charges, the state has not proven its case and the jury must find the
defendant not guilty. (Taylor et al., 1981, p. 39)
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After the juries were instructed, they were told to deliberate to reach a verdict. There were no
significant differences in verdict decision by type of instruction. Nine of the ten juries reached a
verdict of not guilty, while the tenth jury was deadlocked. Severance et al. (1984) discovered a
similar relationship when they reported that psycholinguistically rewritten instructions did not
reliably affect verdicts.
Researchers have argued that jurors’ confusion about the capital penalty phase process
tends to favor the prosecution, although there is no unequivocal evidence that suggests that
prosecutors favor juror miscomprehension (Eisenberg & Wells, 1993; Hoffman, 1995;
Luginbuhl, & Howe, 1995). Luginbuhl and Howe (1995) reported three areas of
miscomprehension that logically favor the prosecution. First, if jurors believe that only listed
mitigating factors can be considered, then this limits the consideration of other factors that could
save a defendant’s life. Second, if jurors believe that a mitigating factor has to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, then the defendant’s attorney has a higher standard to meet than the one the
law requires. Thus, it will be harder for him or her to convince the jury not to kill the defendant.
Third, if the jury concludes that it has to unanimously believe that a mitigating factor exists for it
to be considered, then this limits the scope of factors that a juror or jurors could consider as a
reason to spare the defendant’s life. In addition, Hoffman (1995) has pointed out that if a jury
believes that capital sentencing guidelines mandate a certain decision, which they do not, then it
makes it easier to sentence a defendant to death.
Wiener et al. (1995), Wiener et al. (1998) and Diamond and Levi (1996) are the only
researchers to empirically examine the relationship between juror comprehension of penalty
phase instructions and recommendations for either life in prison or the death penalty. Wiener et
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al. (1995) experimentally exposed jurors to two fact patterns – murder of a spouse and
strangulation of a child – and different instruction types (Missouri’s currently used pattern
instructions or psycholinguistically rewritten instructions). They then asked jurors to make a
sentencing recommendation. Based on a post hoc comparison of verdict decision and
comprehension test score, they reported that jurors who were “less confused” about the
instructions were the least likely to inflict the death penalty on the defendant (Wiener et al.,
1995, p. 463). In other words, jurors who tended to score high on the comprehension test also
tended to recommend a life sentence instead of a death sentence. Based on this study, it appears
that, all other things being equal, more understandable instructions would favor a defendant in
the penalty phase of a capital trial. Wiener et al. (1998) replicated this finding.
Diamond and Levi’s (1996) results also suggest that miscomprehension may increase the
chances of a death sentence. The researchers also examined the relationship between
comprehension score and verdict preference. Their results were similar to those of Weiner et al
(1995; 1998). Participants who understood the instructions were more likely to vote for a life
sentence (r = .20).
In sum, the small amount of research that has examined the relationship between
comprehension and verdict or capital sentencing suggests that comprehension of legal
instructions does not affect juries’ findings of guilt, but that comprehension is related to capital
sentencing recommendations. Clearly, because only three studies have examined this question,
the relationship between comprehension of instructions and verdict or capital sentencing decision
is not well established and future research that examines this issue will contribute to the
knowledge base.
31

Hypotheses
The research on psycholinguistics has yielded positive results. Yet, as Diamond (1993)
has pointed out, the success of psycholinguistics is limited. She argued for instructions that
refute jurors’ preconceived notions. Smith (1993) demonstrated the success of this approach
with decisions on guilt, but it is unclear whether this approach would be effective for capital jury
sentencing instructions. In addition, English and Sales (1997) criticized Smith’s research in part
because her design was too artificial to be usefully generalized to the real world courtroom
setting. Specifically, they argued that her written descriptions of the crime scenarios and jury
instructions were not very comparable to the process of sitting on a jury. The solution to this
criticism is to replicate the research using a different operationalization of the independent
variable and to carry out the experiment in a different, more natural environment (Campbell &
Stanley, 1966). For example, having an audiotape of a judge read the judicial instructions and
present a longer factual summary would be steps towards improving external validity.
To add insight where the extant research is limited, the current study seeks to test the following
hypotheses:
H1:

Capital sentencing instructions that include statements addressing juror

biases will improve mock juror performance on comprehension measures.
H2:

Capital sentencing instructions that include a statement mentioning and

refuting juror bias regarding the level of proof required for mitigating circumstances will
improve mock juror performance on relevant comprehension measures.
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H3:

Capital sentencing instructions that include a statement mentioning and

refuting juror bias regarding consideration of non-enumerated mitigating factors will
improve mock juror performance on relevant comprehension measures.
H4:

Capital sentencing instructions that include a statement mentioning and

refuting juror bias regarding the appropriate method of weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors will improve mock juror performance on relevant comprehension
measures.
H5:

Capital sentencing instructions that include a statement mentioning and

refuting juror bias regarding the level of agreement required to consider a mitigating
factor will improve mock juror performance on relevant comprehension measures.
H6:

Capital sentencing instructions that include a statement mentioning and

refuting juror bias that the law demands a particular verdict will improve mock juror
performance on relevant comprehension measures.
These first six hypotheses predict that comprehension of capital sentencing instructions
will be improved by making subjects aware of their miscomprehension. The next hypothesis
examines a different issue. It examines the relationship between instruction comprehension and
verdict recommendation.
Scholars in this area have logically demonstrated how jurors’ misunderstandings of
capital sentencing instructions hurt the defense. In addition, three studies have empirically
assessed whether understanding is linked to sentencing decision. Wiener et al. (1995, 1998)
demonstrated that the more confused jurors were, the more likely they were to vote for a death
sentence. Diamond and Levi (1996) obtained similar results. Replication of this line of research
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with a different operationalization of the independent variable (i.e., a revision of a judicial
instruction that, instead of being psycholinguistically rewritten, mentions and refutes juror
comprehension biases) should result in improved empirical insight into the relationship.
H7:

Greater understanding of capital sentencing instructions will be associated

with an increased likelihood that mock jurors will recommend a life verdict.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
Participants
Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in communication or criminal
justice/legal studies courses during the late summer and early fall of 2003. The use of college
students may be criticized for lacking generalizability to actual jurors. This claim is contradicted
by the empirical evidence. The research suggests that when exposed to the same legal
instructions, undergraduates’ comprehension of those instructions is similar to actual jurors
(Pryor, Taylor, Buchanan, and Strawn, 1980; Rose and Ogloff, 2003). Additional research
suggests that using undergraduates for jury comprehension research is appropriate. Similar to
actual jurors, college students have difficulty understanding capital sentencing instructions
(Haney and Lynch, 1994), and the comprehension level of college students improves when they
are given psycholinguistically rewritten judicial instructions (Elwork, Sales, and Alfini, 1977;
Severance and Loftus, 1982).
One hundred and ninety-nine subjects participated in this study. Among these subjects,
144 were capital-juror eligible. The process for determining the capital-juror eligibility of each
subject is briefly described in the next paragraph and in more detail later in the chapter. This
experiment involved randomly assigning subjects to a treatment and control condition and
examining the effect of the condition on a dependent variable that was measured at the interval
level. Thus, an independent samples t-test was appropriate for analyzing much of the data. Data
collection was halted when 144 capital-juror eligible subjects were observed. This number of
subjects was deemed appropriate because employing an alpha at the .05 level, assuming a
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medium effect size, and using an independent samples t-test, statistical power was 90.6% (Faul
& Erdfelder, 1992).
Sixty-three percent of the subjects were female. Subjects’ ages ranged from 16 to 50 (M
= 21.5, SD = 4.6). The majority of participants, 67%, indicated they were white. The next most
common ethnic group was African American at 14%. Ninety-one percent of participants
indicated that they had declared a major. Among these subjects, 40% were criminal justice/legal
studies majors, and 60% were other majors. Capital-juror eligible participants are those who are
over 18, believe they are eligible for jury service, and do not believe in always recommending
either a life or death sentence for someone convicted of a capital crime. Seventy-two percent of
the subjects were capital-juror eligible. Because subjects were randomly assigned to treatment
and control conditions, it was expected that there would be no significant differences among
these demographic variables across the conditions; for these variables, no significant differences
were observed. Appendix A depicts this demographic information for each condition in a tabular
format.

Procedure
Research participants were told that they were participating in a study on juror decision
making in the sentencing portion of a capital trial. Specifically, they were told the following:
Thanks for participating in this research. We are interested in understanding juror
decision-making in the sentencing portion of a capital case. In a trial where the defendant
could receive the death penalty, the jury first decides guilt or innocence. If the jury finds
the defendant guilty of a crime that could be punishable by death, a separate trial is held
to determine the sentence. We want to understand how jurors make decisions in this part
of the trial. We are also interested in your opinion about a hypothetical case. In a
moment, we are going to play a tape of a judge summarizing the facts of the case for you
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and reading to you Florida’s capital sentencing instructions. Then we will ask you some
questions. We will also collect some basic demographic data. Your responses will be
confidential, and we will only use them for statistical purposes. It is important to pay
close attention to the tape. The information on the tape will help you answer the survey
questions. The tape will only be played once. Please do not take notes. Just do your best
to listen to the judge’s instructions. We will now play the tape.
Research participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions that were run
simultaneously. In both conditions, research participants listened to an audiotape of a judge
reading a fact scenario. In the pattern instruction condition (n = 93), research participants heard
a judge read Florida’s pattern capital sentencing instructions. In the pattern plus bias-refutation
condition (n = 106), research participants heard Florida’s pattern capital sentencing instructions
with additional statements that mentioned and refuted comprehension biases toward these
instructions.
All research participants, no matter what condition they were assigned to, filled out the
same survey. This survey consisted of verdict recommendation questions and comprehension
questions. Research participants also answered additional questions. The purpose of these
questions will be described later in the chapter.

Stimulus Materials
All research participants were exposed to an identical fact scenario. The fact scenario
used in this study is based on a summary of the fact scenario used by Wiener, Pritchard, and
Weston (1995), although it differs from their summary in several ways. The language has been
revised to make it more understandable for a verbal presentation. The facts have been altered to
take place in Florida, and one of the aggravating factors was altered to make it consistent with
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Florida law. Wiener et al.’s (1995) aggravating factor was “depravity of mind” because two
shots were fired at point blank range. This was changed to having the prosecution describe this
aspect of the offense as “heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” which mirrors the language of Florida’s
capital sentencing statute (F.S. 921.141). An additional fact – the defendant trying to pawn his
wife’s wedding ring – was added to make Mr. Butler’s guilt more apparent. This was done to
ensure that if research participants rendered a life recommendation it was not done because they
had doubts about the defendant’s guilt (Geimer & Amsterdam, 1988; Haney, Sontag, &
Constanzo, 1994; Hoffman, 1995). The judge read a factual summary of both the guilt and
penalty phase of the case. The summary of the guilt phase was as follows:
At 5:10 in the afternoon Steve Olin discovered Mrs. Betty Butler’s body on a
gravel road in North Florida. Mrs. Butler had been shot in the head twice with a .22
caliber gun. Although the first shot killed her, a second contact shot was fired into Mrs.
Butler’s temple. Fingerprints of Mrs. Butler and her husband Dennis Butler were found
inside and outside the automobile that Dennis Butler drove, and tire tracks matching the
car were found near Mrs. Butler’s body. Also found on the trunk of the car were three
unidentified fingerprints.
When Mrs. Butler’s body was discovered, her $7000 diamond ring, which she
reportedly never took off, was missing. After Mrs. Butler’s death, a pawnshop
salesperson testified that Mr. Butler tried to sell him a diamond ring.
When interviewed by the police, Mr. Butler explained that on the day of his
wife’s death he had driven down the gravel road after completing some errands. Mr.
Butler stated that he had stopped at First City Bank at 4:00 p.m. and drove down the
gravel road at about 5:00 p.m. on his way home. The medical examiner told the defense
investigator Mrs. Butler died between 3:40 and 4:20 p.m., but later testified that the time
of death was 5:00 p.m.
Mr. Butler also explained to the police that he owned several guns that were
stolen from his home in Shreveport, Louisiana. In his insurance claim, Mr. Butler stated
that except for a Ruger .22 automatic six shot, all the weapons had been recovered.
However, Frank Arnold, a former boyfriend of Mrs. Butler’s daughter testified that when
he had helped the Butlers move he had seen a Ruger .22 caliber weapon. Mr. Butler
consented to a police search of his home which turned up six guns and some .22 caliber
shells, but no .22 caliber weapon. The police did find Mrs. Butler’s missing diamond
ring in Mr. Butler’s desk.
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At the time of her death, Mrs. Butler had insurance policies with proceeds totaling
$191,000 and a 401K plan valued at $177,000. Dennis Butler was the beneficiary named
on the plans. Mrs. Butler had increased the coverage on the policies only four months
prior to her death. Based on the foregoing evidence the jury unanimously found Mr.
Butler guilty of first-degree murder.
The following fact scenario was given for the penalty phase:
The state had presented evidence of two aggravating factors that warranted the death
penalty. The state claimed that the murder was committed for financial gain, and it had
argued that the crime was especially “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” because excessive
physical force was used. The prosecution noted the excessive physical force of firing two
shots, the second at point blank range. Members of the defendant’s family testified to
several mitigating circumstances including that Dennis is a polite man who, as a
youngster, attended Catholic schools and participated in intramural sporting activities.
After graduating, Dennis worked as a fireman and then in the oil business. When the oil
business took a downfall, he went back to college and obtained his Bachelor of Science in
computer programming. Mr. Butler had no prior convictions.
Both of the aggravating factors listed here are consistent with Florida Statutes, and Florida law
does not place any restrictions on mitigating factors (F.S. 921.141).
Research participants in the pattern condition heard Florida’s standard capital sentencing
instructions. Research participants in the pattern plus bias-refutation condition also heard the
pattern instructions with additional statements that mentioned and refuted the biases described in
Chapter 1. For the participants assigned to hear the pattern instruction plus bias-refutation
statements, the following statements were added to Florida’s pattern instructions. To address
jurors’ bias about the burden of proof for mitigating factors, the following statement was added:
Many jurors mistakenly believe that because other elements of a criminal proceeding
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense must prove a mitigating factor
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not the case. You need only be reasonably convinced
that a mitigating factor exists in order to consider it established.
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The following statement to address jurors’ comprehension bias on the issue of nonenumerated mitigating factors (i.e., jurors may consider any factor as a reason for a life sentence)
was inserted in the instructions:
Many jurors falsely conclude that because they may only consider aggravating factors
stated in these instructions that they also may only consider mitigating factors stated in
these instructions. This is not the case. Jurors may consider any factor as a reason to
recommend the defendant be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
As a way of addressing jurors’ propensity for simply adding up the number of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and making a quantitative judgment, this additional
statement was included in the pattern plus bias-refutation condition:
Many jurors incorrectly believe that it is appropriate to add up the number of aggravators
and mitigators and vote for a death sentence if there are more aggravators, or a life
sentence if there are more mitigators. This is not correct. It is not appropriate to simply
add up the aggravating and mitigating factors to see which side has more. For example, a
jury may decide that one aggravating factor outweighs two mitigating factors or that one
mitigating factor outweighs two aggravating factors.
To address jurors’ notion that the jury has to be unanimous that a mitigating factor exists
in order to consider it, the following statement was added in the pattern plus bias-refutation
condition:
Many jurors believe that the jury has to be unanimous that a mitigating factor exists in
order for it to be considered. This is not true. If only one juror believes that a mitigating
factor exists then that juror may still use it as a reason to recommend a life sentence
without the possibility of parole.
The fifth two-sided message strategy inserted in the pattern plus bias-refutation condition
addressed jurors belief that in particular instances the law demands a particular verdict. The
following statement was included:
Many jurors believe that they are not responsible for their decision because the law
demands a particular verdict. This is not the case. Each juror must consider the evidence
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in the case to decide what sentence is appropriate. The weight of the evidence in this
particular case should be used to decide whether to recommend a life sentence without
the possibility of parole or a death sentence.
The full text of the pattern instructions is provided in Appendix B, and the full text of the pattern
instructions with bias refutation statements is provided in Appendix C.

Dependent Measures
There were two dependent variables in this research. The first was verdict
recommendation. The second was juror comprehension of the law.

Verdict Recommendation
Verdict recommendation was measured by asking research participants, “For Mr. Butler,
toward which sentencing recommendation are you leaning?” Research participants had the
option of selecting life in prison without the possibility of parole or death. This measure was
similar to the one used by Diamond and Levi (1996) who asked subjects to indicate which
verdict they were “leaning” toward rather than asking for a certain decision.

Comprehension of Capital Sentencing Instructions
Getting jurors to understand judicial instructions is similar to instructing students. It
makes sense, therefore, to look to the educational literature for a conceptualization of
comprehension. According to Bloom (1956, p. 89), the standard of comprehension is described
as “when students are confronted with a communication they are expected to know what is being
communicated and to be able to make some use of the materials or ideas contained in it.” Bloom
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then defined two dimensions of comprehension that are relevant to the proposed study. The first
is translation, which involves putting communication in “another language, into other terms, or
into another form of communication” (p. 89). The second type of comprehension is
interpretation, “which involves dealing with a communication as a configuration of ideas whose
comprehension may require a reordering of the ideas into a new configuration in the mind of the
individual” (p. 90).
The operational measures used by past researchers have face validity for these two
dimensions of comprehension. Regarding translation, Charrow and Charrow (1979) had
research participants paraphrase the instructions to which they were exposed (for another
example of translation see Haney & Lynch, 1994). Concerning interpretation, Blankenship,
Luginbuhl, Cullen, and Redick (1997) gave research participants jury deliberation scenarios and
asked them if the actions in the scenario were legally correct (also see Frank and Applegate,
1998). In other words, research participants had to interpret whether or not the communication
they heard (i.e., judicial instruction) was consistent or inconsistent with the scenario. On their
face, it appears that past operational measures of comprehension are consistent with the
conceptualization of the term in the educational literature.
In terms of the jury’s ability to apply the law to a particular case, interpretation is the
most salient dimension. Translation, while an important aspect of comprehension, is not
something jurors would be called upon to do in practice. By using measures previously
developed to assess comprehension as interpretation, the present study has good face validity.
To assess comprehension of capital sentencing instructions, research participants were
asked to evaluate jury deliberation scenarios and report on whether the hypothetical jury or juror
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followed the law. In addition, research participants were asked multiple choice comprehension
questions. For both types of questions, research participants had the opportunity to select “I
don’t know” as a response. In the comprehension areas of burden of proof for mitigators, nonenumerated mitigators, weighing, and unanimity on mitigating factors, the scenarios were taken
from questions used by Blankenship et al. (1997). The perceived personal responsibility
scenario and multiple-choice question were written for this study. The multiple choice questions
used in the area of burden of proof for mitigators, non-enumerated mitigators, and unanimity on
mitigating factors were used by Frank and Applegate (1998). So that research participants were
not confused by the new facts in the scenarios, they were instructed that the examples in the
question were unrelated to the facts given by the judge. This instruction was given to subjects
because in the scenario questions participants were given examples of mitigation that were not
relevant to the Butler case.
Burden of Proof for Mitigating Factors. The following multiple-choice question and
scenario were used to assess whether the research participants understood the law with regard to
burden of proof for mitigating circumstances:
Burden of Proof for Mitigating Factors – 1
Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, for a factor in favor of a life
sentence to be considered, it has to be …
A. proved beyond a reasonable doubt
B. proved by a preponderance of the evidence
C. proved so that a juror is reasonably convinced that it exists
D. I don’t know
(Correct Answer = C)
Burden of Proof for Mitigating Factors – 2
The jurors hear evidence that the defendant cooperated with the police. The jurors agree
that this is mitigating evidence, but they do not believe it has been proven beyond a
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reasonable doubt. The jury therefore does not consider the defendant’s cooperation as a
mitigating circumstance. Did the jury follow the law? (Correct Answer = No)
Unenumerated Mitigating Factors. The following multiple-choice question and two
scenarios were used to assess whether the research participants understood the law with regard to
consideration of non-enumerated mitigating circumstances:
Unenumerated Mitigating Factors – 1
Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, what factors in favor of a life
sentence instead of a death sentence can the jury consider?
A. any mitigating factor that made the crime not as bad
B. only a specific list of mitigating factors mentioned by the judge
C. only mitigating factors that would excuse the crime
D. I don’t know
(Correct Answer = A)
Unenumerated Mitigating Factors – 2
The jurors hear evidence that the defendant was well-behaved as a boy. They also
believe this is mitigating evidence. However, one juror notes that being a good child is
not one of the mitigating circumstances that the judge specifically mentioned. For this
reason she concludes that she cannot consider this as a mitigating circumstance. Did the
juror follow the law? (Correct answer = No)
Unenumerated Mitigating Factors – 3
The jurors decide from the evidence that the defendant felt great remorse for committing
the murder. They also decide that remorse is a mitigating circumstance, even though
remorse was not one of the mitigating circumstances specifically mentioned by the judge.
In deciding whether to recommend a life sentence or the death penalty, they consider the
defendant’s remorse as a mitigating circumstance anyway. Did the jury follow the law?
(Correct answer = Yes)
In the latter scenario, the word “impose” which was used by Blankenship et al. (1997) was
replaced with the word “recommend” because in Florida the jury renders an advisory verdict
(F.S. 921.141).
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Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. The following scenarios were used to
assess research participants’ understanding of the appropriate method of weighing aggravating
and mitigating factors:
Weighing of Aggravators and Mitigators – 1
The jury finds the existence of three aggravating circumstances and only two mitigating
circumstances. Since the jury counted more aggravating circumstances than mitigating
circumstances, the jury votes to recommend a death sentence. Did the jury follow the
law? (Correct answer = No)
Weighing of Aggravators and Mitigators – 2
The jurors unanimously agree that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
They also agree that this is an aggravating circumstance, and that it is not outweighed by
the mitigating circumstances that exist as they interpret the instructions. This means they
must vote to recommend the death penalty, and they do so. Did the jury follow the law?
(Correct answer = Yes)
The wording of the above scenarios was altered from the original to make it consistent with the
jury’s advisory role (F.S. 921.141).
Unanimity on Mitigating Factors. The following multiple-choice question and two
scenarios were used to assess research participants’ understanding of the issue of jury unanimity
on the existence of mitigating circumstances:
Unanimity on Mitigators – 1
Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, for a factor in favor of a life
sentence without the possibility of parole over a death sentence to be considered by the
jury in making their sentencing decision…
A. all jurors have to agree on that factor
B. jurors do not have to agree unanimously on that factor
C. I don’t know
(Correct Answer = B)
Unanimity on Mitigators – 2
Eleven jurors decide from the evidence that the defendant was abused as a child. The
same eleven jurors decide that this history of child abuse is a mitigating circumstance.
One juror disagrees that such abuse is a mitigating circumstance. Since the jurors cannot
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unanimously agree that being abused as a child is a mitigating circumstance, they do not
consider it any further. Did the jury follow the law? (Correct answer = No)
Unanimity on Mitigators – 3
The defendant was only 25 years of age when he committed the murder. A juror decides
that the defendant’s age is a mitigating circumstance. However, the other eleven jurors
disagree and insist that his age is not a mitigating circumstance. This one juror believes
that she cannot consider a mitigating circumstance unless the entire jury unanimously
agrees that it exists. She therefore votes for the death penalty. Did the juror follow the
law? (Correct answer = No)
Perceived Personal Responsibility. The following multiple-choice question and
scenario were used to assess whether jurors understand that the law does not demand a particular
verdict:
Perceived Personal Responsibility – 1
Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, which of the following
sentences does Florida law say should be the penalty for capital murder?
A. death sentence
B. life in prison without the possibility of parole
C. the jury must decide in each individual case which sentence to recommend
D. I don’t know
(Correct Answer = C)
Perceived Personal Responsibility – 2
One juror feels uneasy about recommending a death sentence. The other jurors explain to
this holdout juror that the law demands a death recommendation and that the advisory
sentence is out of the jury’s hands. The holdout juror joins the majority. Did the jury
follow the law? (Correct answer = No)
All measures were coded as either correct or incorrect (i.e., correct = 1 and incorrect = 0).
A selection of “I don’t know” was coded as incorrect. An overall comprehension score was
computed by calculating the percent of questions that a participant answered correctly. Two
subjects did not respond to all of the comprehensions questions. These subjects were excluded
from all analyses that examined total comprehension score.
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Additional Measures
There were four additional types of measures in this research. The first set of measures
was designed as a validity check. The second group of measures assessed covariates that could
be related to one of the dependent variables. The third set of measures assessed subjects’ capitaljuror eligibility. The fourth type of measures collected basic demographic data.
Validity Check
As a type of validity check, research participants were asked other comprehension
questions not related to the areas of miscomprehension that the pattern plus bias-refutation
instructions addressed. Research participants were asked about the meaning of “aggravating
factors” and “mitigating factors.” These questions came from Frank and Applegate (1998).
Because no particular biases were apparent on the meanings of aggravation and mitigation and
no effort was made to improve comprehension of these areas, it was expected that research
participants in the treatment and control conditions would show similar levels of comprehension
of the meaning of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Covariates
Participants were asked to assess the likelihood that Mr. Butler is guilty of murder. This
was done to assess the possibility that participants recommended a life sentence without the
possibility of parole because of doubts about Mr. Butler’s guilt (Geimer & Amsterdam, 1988;
Haney, Sontag, & Constanzo, 1994; Hoffman, 1995).
In a series of five questions, participants were asked to indicate their level of worry about
a non-executed defendant being released, escaping, harming another inmate, harming a guard,
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and not getting as much punishment as he deserves. These questions were asked to assess the
impact of these concerns on verdict recommendation. Previous research has suggested that
concern about the future dangerousness of a non-executed capital defendant is one reason that
jurors reach a sentence of death. For example, capital jurors often erroneously believe that a
defendant sentenced to LWOP will be released. Because of this belief, jurors often sentence a
defendant to death (Foglia, 2003).
Subjects were asked if they had declared a major, and if they indicated that they had, they
were then asked in an open-ended question to state their major. These responses were then
coded as either a criminal justice/legal studies major or a non-major. These questions were
asked to assess the relationship between major and comprehension.

Capital-Juror Eligibility
To determine whether participants were eligible to serve on a jury, they were asked to
answer “yes,” “no,” or “not sure” to the following question:
The following are the requirements to serve on a jury:
Jurors must be United States citizens.
Jurors must be at least eighteen years old.
Jurors cannot be full-time law enforcement officers.
Jurors cannot be convicted felons unless they have had their civil rights restored.
Based on the above requirements, do you believe you are eligible to serve on a jury?
Answering “yes” to this question was necessary for subjects to be treated as juror-eligible (see
F.S. 40.01 and F.S. 40.013). Meeting the requirement of juror eligibility was necessary for
participants to be treated as capital-juror eligible.
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To determine whether respondents were eligible to serve on a capital jury, they were
death and life qualified. Death-qualified jurors are those jurors who would be able to vote for a
death sentence if the evidence supported it. To put it another way, death-qualified jurors do not
have any conscientious scruples that would prohibit them from voting for a sentence of death
that was justified by the evidence. The practice of disqualifying jurors from serving on capital
juries because they could not impose a sentence of death was allowed by the Supreme Court in
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) and reaffirmed in Wainwright v. Witt (1985). In contrast, lifequalified jurors are those jurors who would be able to vote for a life sentence if the evidence
supported it. In other words, life-qualified jurors do not have a belief that all defendants
convicted of capital murder should be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court, in Morgan v.
Illinois (1992), endorsed the practice of challenging jurors for cause who would always vote for
a death sentence if the defendant were convicted of a capital crime.
The following question was used to death and life qualify subjects:
Please read each of the following statements completely and then indicate the one
statement that comes closest to how you would feel if you were a juror in a death penalty
case.
I am strongly in favor of capital punishment: I would vote for a sentence of death in all
cases where the law allowed it and I was sure, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant was guilty of the crime.
I generally favor the death penalty, but I would sometimes vote for a sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole, if I believed that the evidence supported such a
sentence.
I neither favor nor oppose the death penalty.
I generally oppose the death penalty, but would sometimes vote for a sentence of death if
I believed that the evidence supported such a conclusion.
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I strongly oppose the death penalty, and would never vote for it, even in the worst cases
of murder.
Participants who selected any of the middle three options were treated as being both death and
life qualified. Subjects who choose the first option were treated as being not life qualified.
Subjects who choose the last option were treated as not being death qualified. This question was
used by Frank and Applegate (1998).

Demographics
Research participants were asked to report their gender, age, and race. This information
was only collected to describe the sample. There is no theoretical reason to suggest that these
variables have an impact on comprehension. In examining the literature, Liberman and Sales
(1997) concluded that there was no relationship between age or gender and comprehension. In
addition to finding no relationship between age or gender and comprehension, Frank and
Applegate (1998) found no relationship between race and instruction comprehension. A number
of researchers have found a relationship between education and instruction comprehension (e.g.,
Buchanan, Pryor, Taylor & Strawn 1978; Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Diamond & Levi, 1996;
Frank & Applegate, 1998). Because the college students used in this study were homogeneous
with regard to education (i.e., they had some college), no education data was collected. A copy
of the questionnaire, containing all measures, is included in Appendix D.
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Analysis Strategy
The focus of this research is on the internal validity of the relationship between
instruction type and comprehension of the instructions. Thus, the preference is to retain as many
cases as possible. However, to give consideration to the possible generalizability of these results
to actual capital juries, two sets of analyses were conducted, one for all subjects and one for
capital-juror eligible subjects. This allows for a determination of whether the findings differ
substantially when those who would not be eligible to serve on a capital jury are excluded from
the analysis.
In the interpretation of the analyses to follow, consideration is given to whether observed
relationships are statistically significant. Following convention, statistical tests are regarded as
significant if the probability of a Type I error is less than or equal to 5 percent. Cohen (1994),
however, observes that the traditional .05 level is arbitrary and that adherence to it can lead to
erroneous conclusions about the generalizability of relationships. Recognizing these facts,
results are reported that are near but not equal to or below the .05 cut off as “approaching
significance,” “borderline significant,” or with other phrases that recognize a slightly higher risk
of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis. Such terminology and interpretation are common in the
literature on jury comprehension (see, for example, Buchanan, Pryor, Taylor & Strawn, 1978;
Diamond & Levi, 1996; Smith, 1991). Here, the use of these terms reflects an a priori choice to
be somewhat flexible in the interpretation of statistical significance. These phrases should not be
understood as a change in the acceptable level of significance after-the-fact. Probability levels
are reported throughout so that the reader may also apply his or her own interpretations.
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS
The Relationship between Condition and Overall Comprehension
Twelve questions assessed subjects’ comprehension of those five areas addressed by the
bias-refutation statements. For each subject who responded to all twelve questions, a
comprehension score was calculated by dividing the number of correct responses by twelve.
Overall, participants answered 53.3% (N = 197, SD = 24.4) of the questions correctly. Subjects
in the treatment condition were exposed to capital jury sentencing instructions that mentioned
and refuted biases in known areas of miscomprehension, whereas subjects in the control
condition heard the capital-jury instructions without the additional statements. Participants in the
control condition answered 46.3% (n = 92, SD = 21.0) of these questions correctly. Participants
in the treatment condition answered 59.4% (n = 105, SD = 25.6) of the questions correctly. This
difference was statistically significant, t(195) = 3.885, p < .001.
A second analysis was performed for those subjects who were capital-juror eligible.
Excluded from this analysis were subjects who indicated they were younger than 18, believed
they were not eligible to be a juror, or confessed that they would always recommend either a
death or life sentence regardless of the facts of any individual case. Overall, these participants
answered 55.5% (n = 142, SD = 24.3) of the comprehension questions correctly. Subjects in the
control condition answered 47.5% (n = 62, SD = 21.2) of the comprehension questions correctly,
whereas those in the treatment condition answered 61.8% (n = 80, SD = 24.9) of the questions
correctly. This difference was statistically significant, t(140) = 3.623, p < .001.
To assess the impact of major on comprehension, a 2 (treatment versus control) x 2
(criminal justice/legal studies major versus non-major) between-subjects ANOVA on
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comprehension of the five areas addressed by the bias-refutation statements was calculated. For
all subjects, a significant main effect was observed for condition with subjects in the treatment
condition answering more questions correctly, F(1, 177) = 11.227, p = .001. A significant main
effect was also observed for major, F(1, 177) = 6.317, p = .013. Criminal justice/legal studies
majors answered 60.0% (n = 71, SD = 23.0) of the questions correctly, whereas non-criminal
justice/legal studies majors answered 50.6% (n = 107, SD = 24.7) of the questions correctly. No
interaction of treatment x major was observed.
The above analysis was repeated for capital-juror eligible participants. For these
subjects, a significant main effect was observed for condition with subjects in the treatment
condition answering more questions correctly, F(1, 129) = 8.573, p = .004. A borderline
significant main effect was observed for major, F(1, 129) = 3.724, p = .056. Criminal
justice/legal studies majors answered 62.2% (n = 50, SD = 23.2) of the questions correctly,
whereas non-majors answered 52.8% (n = 80, SD = 24.2) of the questions correctly. For capitaljuror eligible participants, no interaction of treatment x major was observed.

Responses to Individual Comprehension Items
Table 3.1 depicts the relationship between condition and comprehension of the individual
items (The title of the items are matched with the individual questions in the methodology).
Listed in this table are those comprehension questions that were addressed by the bias-refutation
statements in the treatment condition. Significant differences were observed for 7 of these 12
items. Among all of these significant differences, the comprehension level was higher in the
treatment condition than in the control condition. A closer examination of Table 3.1 reveals that
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the bias-refutation statements were more successful in some areas than in others at improving
comprehension of the law. One area of the law on which the bias-refutation statements had no
apparent effect was in dispelling jurors’ notion that they were not responsible for their decision.
In the other four comprehension areas, at least one of the questions measuring the legal concept
showed significant improvement in the treatment condition. In two comprehension areas, burden
of proof for mitigating factors and unenumerated mitigating factors, all of the comprehension
questions were answered correctly more often by subjects in the treatment condition, and these
differences were significant. Lastly, one question, the third on unanimity on mitigators, showed
borderline statistical improvement in the treatment condition.
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Table 3.1: Comprehension Levels on Individual Items for all Subjects
Comprehension Item

Control

Treatment

Burden of Proof for
Mitigating Factors – 1**

25.8%
n =93

41.5%
n = 106

Burden of Proof for
Mitigating Factors – 2**

29.0%
n = 93

43.4%
n = 106

Unenumerated Mitigating
Factors – 1**

39.8%
n = 93

54.3%
n = 105

Unenumerated Mitigating
Factors – 2 ***

12.9%
n = 93

33.0%
n = 106

Unenumerated Mitigating
Factors – 3**

30.1%
n = 93

45.3%
n = 106

Perceived Personal
Responsibility – 1

62.0%
n = 92

66.7%
n = 105

Perceived Personal
Responsibility – 2

65.6%
n = 93

71.7%
n = 106

Unanimity on
Mitigators – 1

61.3%
n = 93

68.9%
n = 106

Unanimity on
Mitigators – 2***

44.1%
n = 93

65.1%
n = 106

Unanimity on
Mitigators – 3*

60.2%
n = 93

72.6%
n = 106

Weighing of Aggravators
And Mitigators - 1***

41.9%
n = 93

67.0%
n = 106

Weighing of Aggravators
And Mitigators – 2

79.6%
n = 93

80.2%
n = 106

*
**
***

p < .10, independent samples t - test
p < .05, independent samples t - test
p < .01, independent samples t - test
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A second analysis of the individual items examined only those subjects who were capitaljuror eligible. Table 3.2 depicts the relationship between condition and comprehension of the
individual items for capital-juror eligible subjects. As with Table 3.1, this table lists those
comprehension questions that were addressed by the bias-refutation statements in the treatment
condition. Statistically significant differences were observed for 4 of the 12 comprehension
items. Among all of these statistically significant differences, comprehension was higher in the
treatment condition. Additionally, three questions showed borderline statistical improvement in
the treatment condition.
Comparing this table to Table 3.1, it can be seen that two questions that were statistically
significant for all subjects, the second question on burden of proof for mitigating factors and the
second question on unanimity on mitigators, showed only borderline statistical improvement for
capital-juror eligible subjects in the treatment condition. Another difference emerged between
the subject groups: for capital-juror eligible subjects, the third question on unenumerated
mitigating factors showed no significant difference between the treatment and control condition,
although among all subjects, a significant difference was observed for this question. Because the
pattern of results shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are quite similar, the differences in statistical
significance likely reflect the smaller number of cases – and, thus, reduced statistical power – of
the analysis using only capital-juror eligible respondents.
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Table 3.2: Comprehension Levels on Individual Items for Capital-Juror Eligible Subjects
Comprehension Item

Control

Treatment

Burden of Proof for
Mitigating Factors – 1**

23.8%
n = 63

44.4%
n = 81

Burden of Proof for
Mitigating Factors – 2*

31.8%
n = 63

45.7%
n = 81

Unenumerated Mitigating
Factors – 1**

38.1%
n = 63

58.8%
n = 80

Unenumerated Mitigating
Factors – 2 ***

14.3%
n = 63

33.3%
n = 81

Unenumerated Mitigating
Factors – 3

31.8%
n = 63

44.4%
n = 81

Perceived Personal
Responsibility – 1

64.5%
n = 62

66.3%
n = 80

Perceived Personal
Responsibility – 2

71.4%
n = 63

74.1%
n = 81

Unanimity on
Mitigators – 1

63.5%
n = 63

70.4%
n = 81

Unanimity on
Mitigators – 2*

50.8%
n = 63

66.7%
n = 81

Unanimity on
Mitigators – 3*

58.7%
n = 63

72.8%
n = 81

Weighing of Aggravators
And Mitigators – 1***

34.9%
n = 63

74.1%
n = 81

Weighing of Aggravators
And Mitigators – 2

81.0%
n = 63

86.4%
n = 81

*
**
***

p < .10, independent samples t - test
p < .05, independent samples t - test
p < .01, independent samples t - test
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Two additional questions, not listed in the tables, addressed subjects’ understanding of
the meaning of “aggravation” and “mitigation.” Among all subjects (N = 198), 60.1% were able
to correctly identify the meaning of a mitigating factor, and 82.3% were able to correctly identify
the meaning of an aggravating factor. Among capital-juror eligible subjects (n = 143), 62.9%
were able to correctly identify the meaning of a mitigating factor and 83.2% were able to
correctly identify the meaning of an aggravating factor Because the bias-refutation statements
did not address the meaning of these words, it was expected that for these questions no
significant differences would be observed between the treatment and control condition, and no
significant differences were observed between the conditions for these variables. For the
question on the meaning of an aggravating factor, there was no significant difference between
the treatment and control group when examining all subjects, t(196) = -0.535, p = .593, or
capital-juror eligible subjects, t(141) = -0.705, p = .482. For the question on the meaning of a
mitigating factor, there was no significant difference between the treatment and control group
when examining all subjects, t(196) = -0.320, p = .749, or capital-juror eligible subjects, t(141) =
-0.121, p = .904.

Variables in the Multivariate Analyses
Hypothesis 7 predicted that increased comprehension of capital sentencing instructions
would be associated with a sentencing recommendation of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. To provide a test of this hypothesis and to examine other factors that may have been
related to verdict recommendation, two logistic regressions – one for all subjects and one for
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capital-juror eligible subjects – were calculated. Before the results of those regressions are
presented, however, the variables in the equations are discussed.

Comprehension Score
The first independent variable included in the equation was the comprehension score for
all 14 test questions including the questions on the meaning of aggravation and mitigation.
Including these questions was deemed appropriate because understanding the meaning of these
terms is necessary for comprehension of the other elements of capital sentencing instructions.
Comprehension score was calculated by taking the number of questions the subject answered
correctly and dividing by 14. This number was then multiplied by 100. Overall comprehension
for this measure was 55.8% (N = 197, SD = 22.7). For capital-juror eligible subjects, the mean
percentage correct was 58.1% (N = 142, SD = 22.1)

Subjects’ Belief in Mr. Butler’s Guilt
Participants were asked to express their belief in the likelihood that Mr. Butler murdered
his wife. Table 3.3 depicts subjects’ responses to this question. As can be seen from the table,
nearly all the responses fell into two categories. Most participants believed it was very likely
that Mr. Butler murdered his wife. A sizable portion believed that it was somewhat likely that
Mr. Butler murdered his wife. Because 96% of the respondents fell into two categories, the
variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable. Subjects who indicated that they thought it
very likely that Mr. Butler murdered his wife were put into one category, while all other
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respondents were put into the other category (1 = those who were not sure that Mr. Butler
committed murder, 0 = those who were sure Mr. Butler committed murder).

Table 3.3: Subjects’ Belief in Mr. Butler’s Guilt
Likert Response Category

Frequency

N

Very Likely

61%

122

Somewhat Likely

35%

70

Neutral/No Opinion

2%

4

Somewhat Unlikely

2%

3

Very Unlikely

0%

0

Concern about the Future of a Non-Executed Defendant
Table 3.4 depicts the level of worry respondents had about the future of a non-executed
defendant. Scores on these variables can range from one to four (1 = not at all worried, 2 =
slightly worried, 3 = somewhat worried, 4 = very worried). As can be seen from the table,
respondents were most worried that a non-executed defendant would not be getting what he
deserved. Respondents were least worried about a non-executed inmate harming another inmate
or escaping from prison. Reliability analysis showed that these items were all measuring the
same thing, Cronbach’s Alpha = .74. Reliability would not have been improved by dropping any
one of these questions from the analysis. Because reliability was acceptable and would not have
been improved by dropping a question, these five questions were combined into an index
variable by summing the individual items and dividing by five. Descriptive statistics for the
60

index are also depicted in Table 3.4. Overall, participants were a little more than slightly
worried about the possible negative effects of not executing a capital defendant.

Table 3.4: Concern About the Future of a Non-Executed Defendant
Question

Mean

SD

N

How worried are you that a capital
defendant who is not executed will
be released from prison someday?

2.37

1.00

199

How worried are you that a capital
defendant who is not executed will
escape from prison?

1.87

.93

199

How worried are you that a capital
defendant who is not executed will
harm another prison inmate?

1.86

.94

198

How worried are you that a capital
defendant who is not executed will
harm a prison guard?

2.24

1.07

199

How worried are you that a capital
defendant who is not executed will
not get as much punishment as he
deserves?

2.56

1.07

199

Index of the five “worried” questions

2.18

.68

198

Multivariate Analysis on Verdict
Two binary logistic regressions were calculated. The first was for all subjects. The
second was for capital-juror eligible subjects. The dependent measure for both analyses was
sentencing recommendation (1 = life, 0 = death). Among all subjects, 66.7% (n = 132)
recommended life, and 33.3% (n = 66) recommended death.
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All Subjects
For all subjects, logistic regression analysis was employed to predict the probability that a
subject would recommend a life sentence instead of a death sentence. As stated earlier, the
predictor variables were subjects’ perception of Mr. Butler’s guilt, subjects’ understanding of
capital sentencing instructions, and subjects’ concern over the future of a non-executed
defendant. A test of the full model versus a model with intercept only was statistically
significant, χ² (3, N = 195) = 58.385, p < .001. The model was able to correctly classify 55.4%
of those who recommended a death sentence and 80.0% of those who recommended a life
sentence for an overall success rate of 71.8%. Nagelkerke R² was .359.
Table 3.5 shows the logistic regression coefficient, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of
the predictors. Subjects’ perceptions of Mr. Butler’s guilt and subjects’ comprehension score
were significantly related to sentencing recommendation. Subjects who understood the
instructions were moderately more likely to recommend a life sentence. Specifically, controlling
for all other variables, every one-percentage point increase in comprehension score increases the
odds of a life verdict by 1.6%. The odds ratio for subjects’ perception of Mr. Butler’s guilt
shows that when holding all other variables constant a subject who is not sure Mr. Butler is
guilty is over 20 times more likely to recommend a life sentence.

62

Table 3.5: Predicting the Probability of Recommending a Life Sentence For All Subjects
Predictor

β

Wald χ²

p

Odds Ratio

Perception of Guilt

2.998

28.806

.000

20.041

Comprehension Score

0.016

3.860

.049

1.016

Concern Over the
Future of a Non-executed
Defendant

-.484

3.263

.071

.616

Capital-Juror Eligible Subjects
The same analysis as above was performed for only capital-juror eligible subjects. A test
of the full model versus a model with intercept only was statistically significant, χ² (3, n = 141) =
40.413, p < .001. The model was able to correctly classify 43.2% of those who recommended a
death sentence and 83.5% of those who recommended a life sentence for an overall success rate
of 70.9%. Nagelkerke R² was .350.
Table 3.6 shows the logistic regression coefficient, Wald test, and odds ratio for each of
the predictors. Among capital-juror eligible subjects, the only predictor variable significantly
related to the dependent variable was subjects’ perceptions of Mr. Butler’s guilt. Controlling for
the other predictor variables, uncertainty about Mr. Butler’s guilt increases the odds of a life
sentence more than 27 times. As with all subjects, level of comprehension was related to verdict
recommendation, but this relationship only approached significance (p < .10).
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Table 3.6: Predicting the Probability of Recommending a Life Sentence For Capital-Juror
Eligible Subjects
Predictor

β

Wald χ²

p

Odds Ratio

Perception of Guilt

3.319

18.923

.000

27.620

Comprehension Score

0.016

2.731

.098

1.016

Concern Over the
Future of a Non-executed
Defendant

-.105

0.102

.750

.900
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Overview of the Chapter
In this dissertation, the prediction that a bias-reduction approach could improve juror
understanding of capital sentencing instructions was tested. Additionally, the relationship
between comprehension of capital sentencing instructions and verdict recommendation was
assessed. Both of these predictions were tested by randomly varying the type of instruction (i.e.,
standard pattern instructions or standard pattern instructions plus statements that mention and
refute comprehension biases) for individual subjects and then asking subjects to answer
comprehension questions and render a hypothetical verdict.
In this section, the level of observed support for each of the seven hypotheses is
discussed. Next, the practical implications of these findings are stated. Third, directions for
future research are discussed. Within in this latter section, the weaknesses of the current study
are noted.

The Effect of the Treatment on Instruction Comprehension
Hypothesis 1 predicted that capital sentencing instructions that included statements
addressing juror biases would improve mock juror performance on comprehension measures.
The results of this experiment support the first hypothesis. Comprehension was higher for
subjects exposed to the pattern instructions with bias-refutation statements than for subjects who
were only exposed to the pattern instructions. When examining overall performance on the
comprehension measures addressed by the bias-refutation statements, subjects in the treatment
condition answered 13.1% more of the questions correctly than subjects in the control condition.
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Among capital-juror eligible subjects, subjects in the treatment condition answered 14.3% more
of the questions correctly than subjects in the control condition. It is unlikely that these
differences were the result of chance.
Hypothesis 1 was supported. This supportive finding is consistent with the work of
Smith (1993) who demonstrated that comprehension of judicial instructions could be increased
by exposing subjects to statements that mention and refute comprehension biases. Smith’s
research involved definitions of various crimes (e.g., kidnapping), while the present work
demonstrates the efficacy of this bias-refutation approach with sentencing instructions for the
penalty phase of a capital trial.

Burden of Proof For Mitigators
Hypothesis 2 predicted that capital sentencing instructions that included a statement
mentioning and refuting juror bias regarding the level of proof required for mitigating
circumstances would improve mock juror performance on relevant comprehension measures.
Two questions measured subjects’ understanding of the rule that a juror need only be reasonably
convinced that a mitigating factor exists for it to be considered as established. Among all
subjects, comprehension was significantly higher for subjects exposed to the bias-refutation
statement on burden of proof for mitigating factors. This effect was observed for both questions.
Among capital-juror eligible subjects, comprehension was higher for subjects exposed to the
bias-refutation statement on burden of proof for mitigating factors, but these differences were
significantly different for only one of the two questions measuring this concept. However, the
non-significant difference approached statistical significance (p < .10).
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Although Hypothesis 2 was not supported by every analysis, the bulk of the findings
suggest strong support. The only unsupportive finding was a difference that was borderline
significant when examining only capital-juror eligible subjects. This finding could be a Type II
error. For the measure that was borderline significant, the probability of finding a statistically
significant difference if one actually existed was 38.7% (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992). Statistical
power was low because the effect size between the treatment and control condition was smaller
than expected. The number of capital-juror eligible subjects used in this experiment was based
on an assumption of a medium effect size. The observed effect size for the measure that only
approached statistical significance was small (for a discussion of “small,” “medium,” and “large”
effect sizes see Cohen, 1988)

Unenumerated Mitigating Factors
Hypothesis 3 predicted that capital sentencing instructions that included a statement
mentioning and refuting juror bias regarding consideration of non-enumerated mitigating factors
would improve mock juror performance on relevant comprehension measures. Three questions
measured subjects’ understanding of the rule that jurors may consider mitigating factors other
than those enumerated in the instructions so long as the evidence supports them. When
examining all subjects, significant differences emerged for all three of the comprehension items.
For all of these statistically significant differences, comprehension was higher for subjects
exposed to the bias-refutation statement on unenumerated mitigating factors. When examining
capital-juror eligible subjects, significant differences were observed on two of the three
comprehension measures. For these two statistically significant differences, comprehension was
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higher for participants exposed to the bias-refutation statement on unenumerated mitigating
factors.
The results suggest strong, although not unequivocal, support for Hypothesis 3. As with
Hypothesis 2, the one non-significant result could be a Type II error. For this measure, statistical
power was 33.1% (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992).

Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Hypothesis 4 predicted that capital sentencing instructions that included a statement
mentioning and refuting juror bias regarding the appropriate method of weighing aggravating
and mitigating factors would improve mock juror performance on relevant comprehension
measures. Two questions measured subjects’ understanding of the rule that the weighing process
is qualitative rather than quantitative. For one of the questions, statistically significant
differences were observed for all subjects and capital-juror eligible subjects. An examination of
these statistically significant results revealed that comprehension was higher for participants
exposed to the bias-refutation statement on weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. For
the other question on weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, no significant differences
were observed for either all participants or capital-juror eligible participants.
Hypothesis 4 received mixed support. The divergent findings among the comprehension
questions may have been a function of the bias-refutation statement on weighing of aggravators
and mitigators and the questions measuring understanding of this concept. Recall that the biasrefutation statement on weighing specifically addressed jurors’ propensity for adding up the
number of aggravators and mitigators and using the quantitative result to make a sentencing
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recommendation (e.g., because there are three aggravators and two mitigators, the misguided
jury would recommend death). Significant differences and support for Hypothesis 4 were found
when examining the question that directly measured participants’ understanding of the issue
addressed by the bias-refutation statement. This question asked subjects if it was appropriate to
add up the number of aggravators and mitigators as a method of making a sentencing
recommendation. The question for which no significant differences were observed between the
treatment and control group asked subjects if a death sentence was warranted when the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. This question asked about the weighing
process, but it did not tap into the specific misconception addressed by the bias-refutation
statement. In addition to the question not addressing the specific misconception addressed by the
bias-refutation statement, it is logically possible for subjects to believe the quantitative approach
is the correct one and still answer this question correctly.

Unanimity on Mitigators
Hypothesis 5 predicted that capital sentencing instructions that included a statement
mentioning and refuting juror bias regarding the level of agreement required to consider a
mitigating factor would improve mock juror performance on relevant comprehension measures.
Three questions measured subjects understanding of the rule that a jury does not have to
unanimously agree that a mitigating factor has been established for it to be considered by an
individual juror or jurors who believe it has been established. For one of these three questions,
no significant differences were observed between subjects exposed to the bias-refutation
statement on unanimity on mitigators and those who were not. This non-significant finding was
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observed when examining either all subjects or capital-juror eligible subjects. For the remaining
two questions, among all subjects statistically significant differences emerged for one question,
and a borderline statistically significant difference was observed for the other (p < .10). Among
capital-juror eligible participants, borderline statistically significant differences were observed
for both of these questions (p < .10). In all instances of statistically significant or borderline
statistically significant differences, subjects exposed to the bias-refutation statement on the level
of agreement required for consideration of a mitigating factor performed better on the relevant
comprehension measures than those who were not exposed to this statement.
Hypothesis 5 received weak support. For the three measures, one measure failed to
provide any support for the hypothesis. The other two measures provided support, but this
support generally only approached statistical significance – in only one instance, when
examining all subjects, was a statistically significant difference at the conventional .05 level
observed for one of the three measures of this concept.

Perceived Personal Responsibility
Hypothesis 6 predicted that capital sentencing instructions that included a statement
mentioning and refuting juror bias that the law demands a particular verdict will improve mock
juror performance on relevant comprehension measures. Two questions measured subjects’
belief that they were not responsible for their decision and were merely following the law.
Exposure to the bias-refutation statement that mentioned and refuted the bias that the law
demands a particular verdict did not improve performance on either of the relevant
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comprehension measures. This failure to reject the null hypothesis occurred when examining all
subjects and capital-juror eligible subjects. Hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Instruction Comprehension and Verdict Recommendation
Hypothesis 7 predicted that greater understanding of capital sentencing instructions
would be associated with an increased likelihood that mock jurors would recommend a life
verdict. This hypothesis received mixed support. An increased level of comprehension was
associated with a verdict recommendation of LWOP for all subjects and capital-juror subjects,
but this association was only statistically significant when examining all subjects. The lack of
statistical significance for capital-juror eligible subjects may have been a function of reduced
statistical power. The variable that was most strongly associated with sentencing
recommendation was certainty of the defendant’s guilt. Participants unsure of the defendant’s
guilt were overwhelmingly more likely to recommend a life sentence.
With the exception of a borderline statistically significant finding for capital-juror
eligible subjects, these results are consistent with the findings of previous research (Diamond &
Levi, 1996; Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995; Wiener et al., 1998) that showed a small to
moderate relationship between comprehension and verdict recommendation. The present study
provides more evidence that suggests that juror miscomprehension of capital sentencing
instructions puts the defense at a disadvantage.
Additionally, these findings are consistent with the past research that found that one
reason that capital-jurors vote for a life sentence is because they have lingering doubts about the
guilt of the defendant (Geimer & Amsterdam, 1988; Haney, Sontag, & Constanzo, 1994;
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Hoffman, 1995). For all subjects and capital-juror eligible subjects, the multivariate analyses
suggest that the mock verdict recommendations were largely a function of whether a participant
had doubts about Mr. Butler’s guilt.

Policy Recommendations
These results suggest that Florida’s pattern capital sentencing instructions are not well
understood, but because a convenience sample was used, the comprehension levels obtained in
this study should be interpreted with caution. These findings also indicate that exposing subjects
to statements that mention and refute the relevant comprehension biases can improve
comprehension. Because both the present study and previous research (Diamond & Levi, 1996;
Wiener, Pritchard, & Weston, 1995; Wiener et al., 1998) present empirical evidence consistent
with the views of legal commentators that miscomprehension of capital sentencing instructions
favors the prosecution (Eisenberg & Wells, 1993; Hoffman, 1995; Luginbuhl, & Howe, 1995),
improving the comprehension of capital sentencing instructions will increase both the legality of
capital sentencing decisions and the fairness of those decisions. Based on the results of this
study, it is recommended that Florida’s judicial policy makers consider changing capital
sentencing pattern instructions in the following three areas: burden of proof for mitigating
factors, unenumerated mitigating factors, and weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.
These recommendations are based on the observations of capital-juror eligible subjects – those
subjects who are most comparable to actual capital jurors.
The response of judicial policy makers to social scientific findings on the
comprehensibility of legal instructions has been mixed (Tanford, 1991). Tanford’s findings
72

suggest that judicial commissions have been the most responsive to social science research on
instructions comprehension, but that legislatures have made only a few changes in response to
social scientific findings. Furthermore, the courts have not been receptive to appeals based on
claims that the jury did not understand the sentencing instructions (Lieberman and Sales, 1997).
Still, these findings can be useful for attorneys in capital cases. Attorneys could clarify the law
using bias-refutation statements in their closing arguments.

Burden of Proof for Mitigating Factors
Understanding of the standard for proving mitigating factors was exceptionally low. Less
than a quarter (23.8%) of subjects in the control condition were able to correctly answer one of
the questions measuring understanding of the rule that jurors only need to be reasonably
convinced that a mitigating factor exists to consider it established. Nearly half (44.4%) of the
subjects exposed to the improved instructions were able to answer this question correctly. The
other question measuring this concept showed a similar pattern of improvement, although this
improvement showed only borderline statistical improvement. These findings suggest that
judicial policy makers should set about making changes in Florida’s capital-sentencing
instructions with regard to improving capital-juror understanding of the burden for proving
mitigating factors. Substantial increases in comprehension are possible.

Unenumerated Mitigating Factors
Most participants did not understand that they could consider any factor supported by the
evidence as a reason not to sentence a defendant to death, and that they were not bound to only
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consider the mitigating factors stated in the sentencing instructions. For one of the questions
measuring understanding of this concept, fewer than one out of five (14.3%) participants in the
control condition understood this concept. However, one-third of subjects exposed to the
relevant bias-refutation statement were able to answer this question correctly. Additionally, on
one other measure of subjects’ understanding of this concept, comprehension was increased by
over twenty percentage points (from 38.1% to 58.8%) for those subjects exposed to the relevant
bias-refutation statement. These findings suggest that efforts need to be undertaken to increase
capital-jurors understanding of the law regarding unenumerated mitigating factors.

Weighing of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
Fewer than two out of five (34.9%) of subjects in the control condition understood that
the weighing process was not a quantitative one. However, nearly three quarters (74.1%) of
subjects exposed to the bias refutation statement on this matter recognized that a quantitative
approach is legally incorrect. Of all the comprehension questions, the improvement on this
weighing question was the most dramatic. As with the other two areas, because understanding of
this area of the law is poor and can be improved, judicial policy makers ought to examine
reworking the current pattern instructions to address this comprehension deficiency.

Future Research
The results of this dissertation suggest that juror comprehension of capital sentencing
instructions can be improved by mentioning and refuting biases that jurors have towards capital
sentencing instructions. The results of this study provides some support for the hypothesis that
74

comprehension of capital sentencing instructions is related to verdict recommendation. To
address questions raised by these results, it is recommended that future research in this area focus
on six issues. First, the relative efficacy of psycholinguistic rewrites should be compared to a
bias-reduction approach, and the effectiveness of a combination approach should also be
assessed. Second, this study should be replicated with larger sample sizes. Third, this study
should be replicated with a defendant whose guilt is perceived as more certain. Fourth, this
study should be replicated in a more natural environment. Fifth, this research should be
replicated with a randomly selected sample. Sixth, this research should be replicated with more
powerful bias-reduction statements. Seventh, message repetition should be tested as an
alternative explanation for improved comprehension.

Psycholinguistics versus Bias-Reduction
Diamond (1993) argued that for capital-jurors to make legally guided sentencing
decisions, it is necessary to rewrite capital sentencing instructions using a combination of
psycholinguistic principles and statements that address juror biases toward capital sentencing
instructions. Although the results of this dissertation indicate that the bias-reduction approach
can improve comprehension of capital sentencing instructions, these results do not establish the
effectiveness of a rewriting approach that includes both psycholinguistics and bias-reduction.
Future research should attempt to establish the relative efficacy of each individual approach, and
it should also establish the effectiveness of a combination approach.
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Replicate with More Subjects
Among capital-juror eligible subjects, the treatment usually improved subjects’
performance on individual comprehension items, but often this improvement was nonsignificant. Additionally, level of comprehension was statistically associated with verdict
recommendation when examining all subjects, but this association was not observed when
examining capital-juror eligible subjects. Some of these non-significant findings could be Type
II errors. If some of these non-significant findings are Type II errors, it would not be surprising
because statistical power for a number of these measures was low. To test the proposition that
these non-significant findings were Type II errors, this experiment should be replicated with a
larger number of capital-juror eligible subjects. Increasing the number of capital-juror eligible
subjects will increase the statistical power of future research.

Replicate with a Guiltier Defendant
The results of the multivariate analyses suggest that verdict recommendation was heavily
influenced by doubts about the defendant’s guilt. Nearly 40% of the participants in this study
thought it was less than “very likely” that the defendant was guilty of murdering his wife. This
research should be replicated with a defendant who is perceived as definitely guilty. By
replicating with a defendant who is perceived as guilty beyond any doubt, subjects will have to
rely on issues other than lingering doubt about the defendant’s guilt to make a sentencing
recommendation. Replicating with a defendant whose guilt is not in doubt will extend the
external validity of this research.
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Replicate in a More Natural Environment
Replicating this experiment in a more natural environment (e.g., perform the experiment
in a courtroom, have jurors deliberate, use more detailed case material) has the obvious benefit
of enhancing the generalizability of these findings. In addition, replicating this study in a more
natural environment could clarify one of the findings in this research. Replicating these findings
in a more natural environment could more effectively simulate jurors’ miscomprehension over
their perceived personal responsibility.
Across both conditions, subjects’ performance on the perceived personal responsibility
questions was fairly high relative to the other questions. Additionally, the relevant biasrefutation statement had no effect on performance on the perceived personal responsibility
questions. It is possible that the rationalization of non-responsibility for a sentence of death only
occurs when jurors actually sentence someone to death; it may not occur when a juror sentences
an obviously hypothetical defendant to death. By replicating this research in a more natural
environment, participants may get caught up in the events of the experiment and actually feel as
though they are sentencing someone to either death or life in prison without the possibility of
parole. In this type of experiment, there may be observable differences on subjects’
understanding of their sentencing responsibility between subjects exposed to a bias-refutation
statement on perceived personal responsibility and subjects who are not exposed to this
statement.
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Replicate with a Randomly Selected Sample
These results suggest that overall comprehension of Florida’s capital sentencing
instructions is low. Capital-juror eligible subjects exposed to Florida’s pattern instructions
answered 55.5% of the comprehension questions correctly. For a number of individual
measures, it was common for less than a third of subjects in the pattern instruction condition to
answer the question correctly. Because this sample contained criminal justice/legal studies
majors who were significantly more successful than non-majors at answering comprehension
questions, these findings may overestimate the comprehension levels of actual capital jurors.
Because a convenience sample was used, however, it is not appropriate to generalize the
comprehension levels observed in this study to actual capital jurors. If Florida’s policy makers
are interested in describing capital jurors’ comprehension of the pattern instructions used in the
penalty phase of a capital trial more precisely, then this research should be replicated with a
sample randomly selected from the population of Florida’s capital-juror eligible residents.

Replicate with More Powerful Bias-Reduction Statements
The bias-reduction statements that successfully improved comprehension often produced
comprehension levels that may be viewed as unacceptably low for a fair trial. For example, for
the first question on burden of proof for mitigating factors, 23.8% of subjects in the control
condition answered this question correctly, whereas 44.4% of subjects in the treatment condition
answered this question correctly. Although this difference was statistically significant, it could
be argued that the level of comprehension obtained in the treatment condition was not acceptable
to ensure that a capital-defendant receives a fair sentencing process.
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Wiener et al. (1995) argued from their results that with capital sentencing instructions a
comprehension ceiling exists. Proponents of a comprehension ceiling contend that there is a
limit to how much comprehension can be enhanced through comprehension improvement
strategies. The results of this study could be used to suggest the existence of a comprehension
ceiling. The empirical research is still too limited, however, to conclusively support the
existence of a comprehension ceiling. English and Sales (1997) argued that Wiener et al.’s
conclusion that researchers who try to improve comprehension of capital sentencing instructions
would face a comprehension ceiling was uncalled for based on the limited available empirical
evidence.
The solution to the related criticisms that a comprehension ceiling exists and that
improved comprehension levels are too low to ensure a fair trial is to replicate this research using
more powerful bias-reduction techniques. It is possible that rewritten bias-reduction statements
or bias-reduction statements used in combination with psycholinguistic techniques could
improve comprehension to higher levels than those obtained in the present study. There has not
been enough research in this area to conclude that a comprehension ceiling exists.

Message Repetition as an Alternative Mediating Variable
The explanation for the results reported in Chapter 4 is that the observed comprehension
improvements were the result of overcoming comprehension biases. However, an alternative
explanation for some of these results is that the improved comprehension was the result of
message repetition. Message repetition has been shown to improve message comprehension
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1989). In the areas of burden of proof for mitigating factors and non79

enumerated mitigating factors, the bias reduction statements repeated using different words
statements that exist in Florida’s pattern instructions. These statements using somewhat different
words repeated points that were already made in the pattern instructions. It is possible that the
observed comprehension improvements were the result of the message repetitive element and not
the bias-reduction element. Future research can address these differing explanations by
implementing competitive experiments that test the differing explanations.

Conclusion
The American jury is the cornerstone of the U.S. legal system. Within this system, the
capital jury has a most serious role of determining whether a defendant should be executed.
Because of the American jury’s importance in the legal system, it is no wonder that the behavior
of the jury has been the focus of so much empirical research.
This dissertation presents a modest empirical contribution in the area of jury
comprehension of legal instructions. The results suggest three very broad conclusions. First,
comprehension of legal instructions can be improved with a bias-reduction approach. Second,
this approach can be used to improve comprehension of Florida’s capital sentencing instructions.
Third, additional research is needed to clarify a number of lingering questions about the best
ways and extent to which jury comprehension of legal instructions can be improved.
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APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES ACROSS
CONDITIONS
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Distribution of Demographic Variables Across Conditions
Variable

Control

Treatment

Male
Female

35.5%
64.5%
(n = 93)

37.7%
62.3%
(n = 106)

White
Non-White

69.9%
30.1%
(n = 93)

65.1%
34.9%
(n = 106)

Gender

Race

Major
Criminal Justice/Legal Studies Major
39.3%
Non-Criminal Justice/Legal Studies Major 60.7%
(n = 84)
Capital-Juror Qualified (N = 199)
Yes
No
Mean Age

40.6%
59.4%
(n = 96)

67.8%
32.2%
(n = 93)

76.4%
23.6%
(n = 106)

21.1 (SD = 4.18)
n = 93

21.8 (SD = 4.98)
n = 106

None of the differences between the treatment and control group were statistically significant.
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APPENDIX B: PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS
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At 5:10 in the afternoon Steve Olin discovered Mrs. Betty Butler’s body
on a gravel road in North Florida. Mrs. Butler had been shot in the head twice with a .22 caliber
gun. Although the first shot killed her, a second contact shot was fired into Mrs. Butler’s temple.
Fingerprints of Mrs. Butler and her husband Dennis Butler were found inside and outside the
automobile that Dennis Butler drove, and tire tracks matching the car were found near Mrs.
Butler’s body. Also found on the trunk of the car were three unidentified fingerprints.
When Mrs. Butler’s body was discovered, her $7000 diamond ring, which she
reportedly never took off, was missing. A pawnshop salesperson testified that, two days after
Mrs. Butler’s death, Mr. Butler tried to sell him a diamond ring.
When interviewed by the police, Mr. Butler explained that on the day of
his wife’s death he had driven down the gravel road after completing some errands. Mr. Butler
stated that he had stopped at First City Bank at 4:00 p.m. and drove down the gravel road at
about 5:00 p.m. on his way home. The medical examiner told the defense investigator Mrs.
Butler died between 3:40 and 4:20 p.m., but later testified that the time of death was 5:00 p.m.
Mr. Butler also explained to the police that he owned several guns that were stolen from
his home in Shreveport, Louisiana. In his insurance claim, Mr. Butler stated that except for a
Ruger .22 automatic six shot, all the weapons had been recovered. However, Frank Arnold, a
former boyfriend of Mrs. Butler’s daughter testified that when he had helped the Butlers move he
had seen a Ruger .22 caliber weapon. Mr. Butler consented to a police search of his home which
turned up six guns and some .22 caliber shells, but no .22 caliber weapon. The police did find
Mrs. Butler’s missing diamond ring in Mr. Butler’s desk.

84

At the time of her death, Mrs. Butler had insurance policies with proceeds totaling
$191,000 and a 401K plan valued at $177,000. Dennis Butler was the beneficiary named on the
plans. Mrs. Butler had increased the coverage on the policies only four months prior to her
death. Based on the foregoing evidence the jury unanimously found Mr. Butler guilty of firstdegree murder.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant has been found guilty of Murder in the
First Degree. The punishment for this crime is either death or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. Final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely with the
judge of this court; however, the law requires that you, the jury, render to the court an advisory
sentence as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant.
The state had presented evidence of two aggravating factors that warranted the death
penalty. The state claimed that the murder was committed for financial gain, and it had argued
that the crime was especially “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” because excessive physical force was
used. The prosecution noted the excessive physical force of firing two shots, the second at point
blank range. Members of the defendant’s family testified to several mitigating circumstances
including that Dennis is a polite man who, as a youngster, attended Catholic schools and
participated in intramural sporting activities. After graduating, Dennis worked as a fireman and
then in the oil business. When the oil business took a downfall, he went back to college and
obtained his Bachelor of Science in computer programming. Mr. Butler had no prior
convictions.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is now your duty to advise the court as to what
punishment should be imposed upon the defendant for his crime of Murder in the First Degree.
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As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the
responsibility of the judge; however, it is your duty to follow the law that will now be given you
by the court and render to the court an advisory sentence based upon your determination as to
whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty
and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances
found to exist.
Your advisory sentence should be based upon the evidence that has been presented to you
in these proceedings.
The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the following
that are established by the evidence:
The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed for financial gain.
The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel. "Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. "Atrocious" means outrageously
wicked and vile. "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference
to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious, or cruel is one
accompanied by additional acts that show that the crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
The State may not rely upon a single aspect of the offense to establish more than one
aggravating circumstance. Therefore, if you find that two or more of the aggravating
circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt by a single aspect of the offense, you are to
consider that as supporting only one aggravating circumstance.
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If you find the aggravating circumstances do not justify the death penalty, your advisory
sentence should be one of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Should you find sufficient aggravating circumstances do exist, it will then be your duty to
determine whether mitigating circumstances exist that outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider, if established by the evidence, are:
Mr. Butler has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
Any of the following circumstances that would mitigate against the imposition of the
death penalty:
Any other aspect of the defendant's character, record, or background.
Any other circumstance of the offense.
Each aggravating circumstance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt before it
may be considered by you in arriving at your decision.
If one or more aggravating circumstances are established, you should consider all the
evidence tending to establish one or more mitigating circumstances and give that evidence such
weight as you feel it should receive in reaching your conclusion as to the sentence that should be
imposed.
A mitigating circumstance need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the
defendant. If you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists, you may
consider it as established.
The sentence that you recommend to the court must be based upon the facts as you find
them from the evidence and the law. You should weigh the aggravating circumstances against
the mitigating circumstances, and your advisory sentence must be based on these considerations.
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In these proceedings it is not necessary that the advisory sentence of the jury be
unanimous.
The fact that the determination of whether you recommend a sentence of death or
sentence of life imprisonment in this case can be reached by a single ballot should not influence
you to act hastily or without due regard to the gravity of these proceedings. Before you ballot
you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that human life
is at stake, and bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your advisory sentence.
You will now retire to consider your recommendation. When you have reached an
advisory sentence in conformity with these instructions, that form of recommendation should be
signed by your foreperson and returned to the court.
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APPENDIX C: PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS WITH BIAS-REFUTATION
STATEMENTS
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At 5:10 in the afternoon Steve Olin discovered Mrs. Betty Butler’s body
on a gravel road in North Florida. Mrs. Butler had been shot in the head twice with a .22 caliber
gun. Although the first shot killed her, a second contact shot was fired into Mrs. Butler’s temple.
Fingerprints of Mrs. Butler and her husband Dennis Butler were found inside and outside the
automobile that Dennis Butler drove, and tire tracks matching the car were found near Mrs.
Butler’s body. Also found on the trunk of the car were three unidentified fingerprints.
When Mrs. Butler’s body was discovered, her $7000 diamond ring, which she
reportedly never took off, was missing. A pawnshop salesperson testified that, two days after
Mrs. Butler’s death, Mr. Butler tried to sell him a diamond ring.
When interviewed by the police, Mr. Butler explained that on the day of
his wife’s death he had driven down the gravel road after completing some errands. Mr. Butler
stated that he had stopped at First City Bank at 4:00 p.m. and drove down the gravel road at
about 5:00 p.m. on his way home. The medical examiner told the defense investigator Mrs.
Butler died between 3:40 and 4:20 p.m., but later testified that the time of death was 5:00 p.m.
Mr. Butler also explained to the police that he owned several guns that were stolen from
his home in Shreveport, Louisiana. In his insurance claim, Mr. Butler stated that except for a
Ruger .22 automatic six shot, all the weapons had been recovered. However, Frank Arnold, a
former boyfriend of Mrs. Butler’s daughter testified that when he had helped the Butlers move he
had seen a Ruger .22 caliber weapon. Mr. Butler consented to a police search of his home which
turned up six guns and some .22 caliber shells, but no .22 caliber weapon. The police did find
Mrs. Butler’s missing diamond ring in Mr. Butler’s desk.
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At the time of her death, Mrs. Butler had insurance policies with proceeds totaling
$191,000 and a 401K plan valued at $177,000. Dennis Butler was the beneficiary named on the
plans. Mrs. Butler had increased the coverage on the policies only four months prior to her
death. Based on the foregoing evidence the jury unanimously found Mr. Butler guilty of firstdegree murder.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant has been found guilty of Murder in the
First Degree. The punishment for this crime is either death or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. Final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely with the
judge of this court; however, the law requires that you, the jury, render to the court an advisory
sentence as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant.
The state had presented evidence of two aggravating factors that warranted the death
penalty. The state claimed that the murder was committed for financial gain, and it had argued
that the crime was especially “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” because excessive physical force was
used. The prosecution noted the excessive physical force of firing two shots, the second at point
blank range. Members of the defendant’s family testified to several mitigating circumstances
including that Dennis is a polite man who, as a youngster, attended Catholic schools and
participated in intramural sporting activities. After graduating, Dennis worked as a fireman and
then in the oil business. When the oil business took a downfall, he went back to college and
obtained his Bachelor of Science in computer programming. Mr. Butler had no prior
convictions.
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is now your duty to advise the court as to what
punishment should be imposed upon the defendant for his crime of Murder in the First Degree.
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As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the
responsibility of the judge; however, it is your duty to follow the law that will now be given you
by the court and render to the court an advisory sentence based upon your determination as to
whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty
and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances
found to exist.
Your advisory sentence should be based upon the evidence that has been presented to you
in these proceedings. Many jurors believe that they are not responsible for their decision
because the law demands a particular verdict. This is not the case. Each juror must consider
the evidence in the case to decide what sentence is appropriate. The weight of the evidence in
this particular case should be used to decide whether to recommend a life sentence without the
possibility of parole or a death sentence.
The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the following
that are established by the evidence:
The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed for financial gain.
The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel. "Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. "Atrocious" means outrageously
wicked and vile. "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference
to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious, or cruel is one
accompanied by additional acts that show that the crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was
unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
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The State may not rely upon a single aspect of the offense to establish more than one
aggravating circumstance. Therefore, if you find that two or more of the aggravating
circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt by a single aspect of the offense, you are to
consider that as supporting only one aggravating circumstance.
If you find the aggravating circumstances do not justify the death penalty, your advisory
sentence should be one of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
Should you find sufficient aggravating circumstances do exist, it will then be your duty to
determine whether mitigating circumstances exist that outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider, if established by the evidence, are:
Mr. Butler has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
Any of the following circumstances that would mitigate against the imposition of the
death penalty:
Any other aspect of the defendant's character, record, or background.
Any other circumstance of the offense.
Many jurors falsely conclude that because they may only consider aggravating factors
stated in these instructions that they also may only consider mitigating factors stated in these
instructions. This is not the case. Jurors may consider any factor as a reason to recommend the
defendant be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
Each aggravating circumstance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt before it
may be considered by you in arriving at your decision.
If one or more aggravating circumstances are established, you should consider all the
evidence tending to establish one or more mitigating circumstances and give that evidence such
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weight as you feel it should receive in reaching your conclusion as to the sentence that should be
imposed.
A mitigating circumstance need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the
defendant. If you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists, you may
consider it as established. Many jurors mistakenly believe that because other elements of a
criminal proceeding must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense must prove a
mitigating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not the case. You need only be reasonably
convinced that a mitigating factor exists in order to consider it established.
Also, many jurors believe that the jury has to be unanimous that a mitigating factor exists
in order for it to be considered. This is not true. If only one juror believes that a mitigating
factor exists then that juror may still use it as a reason to recommend a life sentence without the
possibility of parole.
The sentence that you recommend to the court must be based upon the facts as you find
them from the evidence and the law. You should weigh the aggravating circumstances against
the mitigating circumstances, and your advisory sentence must be based on these considerations.
Many jurors incorrectly believe that it is appropriate to add up the number of aggravators and
mitigators and vote for a death sentence if there are more aggravators, or a life sentence if there
are more mitigators. This is not correct. It is not appropriate to simply add up the aggravating
and mitigating factors to see which side has more. For example, a jury may decide that one
aggravating factor outweighs two mitigating factors or that one mitigating factor outweighs two
aggravating factors
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In these proceedings it is not necessary that the advisory sentence of the jury be
unanimous. The fact that the determination of whether you recommend a sentence of death or
sentence of life imprisonment in this case can be reached by a single ballot should not influence
you to act hastily or without due regard to the gravity of these proceedings. Before you ballot
you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that human life
is at stake, and bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your advisory sentence.
You will now retire to consider your recommendation. When you have reached an
advisory sentence in conformity with these instructions, that form of recommendation should be
signed by your foreperson and returned to the court.
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONNAIRE
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Please check one answer for each of the following questions. Remember,
your answers will be kept completely confidential.
1. For Mr. Butler, toward which sentencing recommendation are you
leaning?
 life in prison without the possibility of parole
 death

2. How likely do you think it is that Mr. Butler murdered his wife?






very likely
somewhat likely
neutral/no opinion
somewhat unlikely
very unlikely

To answer the following questions, please think about what the judge on
the tape said. Please answer them as best you can.
3. Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, for a factor in
favor of a life sentence to be considered, it has to be…





proved beyond a reasonable doubt
proved by a preponderance of the evidence
proved so that a juror is reasonably convinced that it exists
I don’t know
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4. Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, the term
“aggravating” means…
 something that is irritating or frustrating about the crime
 something that makes the crime worse
 I don’t know

5. Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, what factors in
favor of a life sentence instead of a death sentence can the jury consider?





any mitigating factor that made the crime not as bad
only a specific list of mitigating factors mentioned by the judge
only mitigating factors that would excuse the crime
I don’t know

6. Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, which of the
following sentences does Florida law say should be the penalty for capital
murder?
 death sentence
 life in prison without the possibility of parole
 the jury must decide in each individual case which sentence to
recommend
 I don’t know

7. Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, what is a
“mitigating factor”?
 a reason not to sentence the defendant to death
 something that excuses the defendant’s behavior
 I don’t know
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8. Based on your understanding of the judge’s instructions, for a factor in
favor a life sentence without the possibility of parole over a death
sentence to be considered by the jury in making their sentencing
decision…
 all jurors have to agree on that factor
 jurors do not have to agree unanimously on that factor
 I don’t know

The following questions use hypothetical scenarios that are unrelated to
the facts of the case you just heard. However, to answer the following
questions, please think about the directions given to the jury on the tape.
9. Eleven jurors decide from the evidence that the defendant was abused as
a child. The same eleven jurors decide that this history of child abuse is a
mitigating circumstance. One juror disagrees that such abuse is a
mitigating circumstance. Since the jurors cannot unanimously agree that
being abused as a child is a mitigating circumstance, they do not consider
it further. Did the jury follow the law?
 yes
 no
 I don’t know

10. The jury finds the existence of three aggravating circumstances and only
two mitigating circumstances. Since the jury counted more aggravating
circumstances than mitigating circumstances, the jury votes to
recommend a death sentence. Did the jury follow the law?
 yes
 no
 I don’t know
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11. The jurors hear evidence that the defendant was well-behaved as a boy.
They also believe this is mitigating evidence. However, one juror notes
that being a good child is not one of the mitigating circumstances that the
judge specifically mentioned. For this reason she concludes that she
cannot consider this as a mitigating circumstance. Did the juror follow the
law?
 yes
 no
 I don’t know

12. The jurors unanimously agree that the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel. They also agree that this is an aggravating
circumstance, and that it is not outweighed by the mitigating
circumstances that exist as they interpret the instructions. This means
that they must vote to recommend the death penalty, and they do so. Did
the jury follow the law?
 yes
 no
 I don’t know

13. The jurors hear evidence that the defendant cooperated with the police.
The jurors agree that this is mitigating evidence, but they do not believe it
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury therefore does not
consider the defendant’s cooperation as a mitigating circumstance. Did
the jury follow the law?
 yes
 no
 I don’t know
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14. The defendant was only 25 years of age when he committed the murder.
A juror decides that the defendant’s age is a mitigating circumstance.
However, the other eleven jurors disagree and insist that his age is not a
mitigating circumstance. This one juror believes that she cannot consider
a mitigating circumstance unless the entire jury unanimously agrees that it
exists. She therefore votes for the death penalty. Did the juror follow the
law?
 yes
 no
 I don’t know

15. One juror feels uneasy about recommending a death sentence. The other
jurors explain to this holdout juror that the law demands a death
recommendation and that the advisory sentence is out of the jury’s hands.
The holdout juror joins the majority. Did the jury follow the law?
 yes
 no
 I don’t know

16. The jurors decide from the evidence that the defendant felt great remorse
for committing the murder. They also decide that remorse is a mitigating
circumstance, even though remorse was not one of the mitigating
circumstances specifically mentioned by the judge. In deciding whether to
recommend a life sentence or the death penalty, they consider the
defendant’s remorse as a mitigating circumstance anyway. Did the jury
follow the law?
 yes
 no
 I don’t know

Now, we would like to know a little bit about you. Remember, this
information is for statistical purposes only.
17. How old are you?

_____ years

101

18. What is your gender?
 male
 female

19. What is your race?







White
African American
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific Islander
Native American
Other

20. The following are the requirements to serve on a jury:
Jurors must be United States citizens.
Jurors must be at least eighteen years old.
Jurors cannot be full-time law enforcement officers.
Jurors cannot be convicted felons unless they have had their civil rights
restored.
Based on the above requirements, do you believe you are eligible to serve
on a jury?
 yes
 no
 not sure

21. Have you declared a major?
 yes Æ
 no

If yes, what is your major? _________________________

102

We are nearly finished. We would like to know about your attitudes toward
the death penalty.
22. How worried are you that a capital defendant who is not executed will be
released from prison someday?





very worried
somewhat worried
slightly worried
not at all worried

23. How worried are you that a capital defendant who is not executed will
escape from prison?





very worried
somewhat worried
slightly worried
not at all worried

24. How worried are you that a capital defendant who is not executed will
harm another prison inmate?





very worried
somewhat worried
slightly worried
not at all worried

25. How worried are you that a capital defendant who is not executed will
harm a prison guard?





very worried
somewhat worried
slightly worried
not at all worried
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26. How worried are you that a capital defendant who is not executed will not
get as much punishment as he deserves?





very worried
somewhat worried
slightly worried
not at all worried

27. Please read each of the following statements completely and then indicate
the one statement that comes closest to how you would feel if you were a
juror in a death penalty case.
 I am strongly in favor of capital punishment: I would vote for a
sentence of death in all cases where the law allowed it and I was sure,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of the crime.
 I generally favor the death penalty, but I would sometimes vote for a
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, if I believed
that the evidence supported such a sentence.
 I neither favor nor oppose the death penalty.
 I generally oppose the death penalty, but would sometimes vote for a
sentence of death if I believed that the evidence supported such a
sentence.
 I strongly oppose the death penalty, and would never vote for it, even
in the worst cases of murder.

Thank you for your participation. Please stay seated until the
proctor collects the questionnaire from everyone.
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